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Abstract
In April 2019, the Canadian Premier League (CPL), a professional domestic soccer league,
launched in Canada, making it the first top-tier league in North America to begin operations in
the modern digital era. The CPL represents a unique and timely opportunity to examine how a
new professional sports league cultivates ties with fan-consumers via sport nationalism, digital
media, and fandom. As yet, there are very few academic works on the CPL, and there is also a
paucity of scholarly publications on the launch of new professional sports leagues in the 21st
century. For this study, two types of qualitative data were collected: semi-structured interviews
with league officials and voices on the Canadian soccer scene; and various primary and
secondary sources, most often news articles, along with works on sports sociology and
marketing. Despite soccer’s status as the “global game,” Canadian sport nationalism has
historically revolved around hockey. While professional soccer leagues in Canada have largely
failed in the past, several key factors—changing national demographics, high rates of youth
participation in soccer, and groups of willing investors—have altered the landscape, contributing
to the formation of the CPL. As traditional television and sports viewing shifts towards
streaming providers, the CPL’s presence on OneSoccer, a digital platform, endows it with
increased authenticity and a more loyal following, particularly as the league is targeting younger
“digital natives.” Supporters’ groups, which enrich fan culture and engagement, are also a key
ingredient of the upstart league. The CPL is being promoted as an authentic Canadian product, as
seen with team names reflecting local or regional identities and Canadian player quotas that
enhance the league’s national bone fides on the pitch.
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Lay Summary
For decades, Canada was the biggest economy in the world without a top-tier, national
professional soccer league. But the launch of the Canadian Premier League (CPL), an
exclusively Canadian professional soccer league, in April 2019 made it the first top-tier sports
league in North America to begin operations in the modern digital era. The CPL represents a
unique and timely opportunity to examine how a new professional sports league cultivates ties
with fan-consumers via sport nationalism, digital media, and fandom. There are relatively few
academic publications on the formation of professional sports leagues (old and new), and there
are even fewer scholarly works on the CPL. Despite being the world’s most popular sport, soccer
has traditionally taken a back seat to hockey in the Canadian sporting scene. While professional
soccer leagues in Canada have generally struggled in the past, several key factors—changing
national demographics, high rates of youth participation in soccer, and groups of willing
investors—have altered the landscape, contributing to the formation of the CPL. As traditional
television and sports viewing shifts towards streaming providers, the CPL’s presence on
OneSoccer, a digital platform, endows it with increased authenticity and a more loyal following,
particularly as the league is targeting a younger audience. Supporters’ groups, which enrich fan
culture and engagement, are also a key component of the upstart league. The CPL is being
promoted as an authentic Canadian product, as seen with team names reflecting local or regional
identities, and domestic player quotas that give the league a strong, distinct Canadian flavour.
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Introduction
Background
Soccer has historically been on the fringe of mainstream Canadian sporting culture, but a
new era has started to emerge. In May 2017, the Canadian Premier League (CPL) was officially
sanctioned by the Canadian Soccer Association—the sport’s national governing body—making it
the top-tier, national domestic professional soccer league in Canada. The CPL’s inaugural season
launched in April 2019 with seven teams from five of Canada’s ten provinces. Initially, the
league expected eight teams to take part in its first season; however, the now-defunct Ottawa
Fury Football Club decided to continue playing in the US-based United Soccer League.1 This left
the CPL with little time to find a replacement, and the league pressed ahead with the following
teams: HFX Wanderers Football Club (Halifax, NS), York United Football Club (York Region,
ON),2 Forge Football Club (Hamilton, ON), Valour Football Club (Winnipeg, MB), Cavalry
Football Club (Calgary, AB), Pacific Football Club (Langford, BC), and Football Club
Edmonton (AB).3 During its inaugural season that ran from April to October 2019, the CPL
adopted a split season (fall and spring) format unfamiliar in North American sport circles, but
popular in many South American soccer leagues.4 Each team was slated to play 28 games,

Bob Williams, “Canadian Premier League off to solid start after filling void for players
and fans,” SportBusiness, November 6, 2019.
1

2

York United FC was initially unveiled as York9 FC in May 2018, but it rebranded as
York United FC in December 2020.
3

In 2020, the CPL welcomed its first expansion team, as Atlético Ottawa joined ahead of
the league’s second season. Atlético Ottawa is owned by the Spanish club, Club Atlético de
Madrid.
Matt Davis, “Canadian Premier League: How do you start a brand new professional
league?” BBC, February 1, 2019.
4

1

subsequently culminating in a two-legged final between the winners of the two halves of the
season.5 Unusually for a North American sports league, there were no playoffs. But, how did the
CPL come to fruition? What are the factors that led to its formation and how can the league be
successful?
Research Problem
Launching a new professional sports league can be a ground-breaking and exciting
venture, but it is far from a straightforward task. Broadly speaking, the process involves
identifying gaps in a country’s sporting landscape and determining ways in which to resolve
these gaps. That sounds simple enough, but in truth, it is a mammoth undertaking. This explains
why many upstart leagues in Canada have faced disappointment in their quest to establish
themselves. While there are relatively few scholarly works on the formation of professional
sports leagues (old and new), previous research indicates several reoccurring factors tend to
contribute to a league’s inability to survive. These include: ownership instability, lack of national
television coverage, minimal audience appeal, high player salaries, and difficulty getting
corporate sponsorships.6 Yet, there remains a dearth of research on how to successfully create a
new professional sports league, which is also the case for the CPL. Since the most recent launch
of a top-tier, professional sports league in North America was in 1996 when Major League

5

Since Cavalry FC won both halves of the 2019 season, a contingency was implemented
which awarded the second finalist berth to the team with the second-best overall record (Forge
FC). Forge FC defeated Cavalry FC 2-0 on aggregate over the two-legged final, becoming the
first-ever CPL champion.
Jack O. Gaylord Jr. and David L. Groves, “Factors in the Formation and Development
of Professional Sports Leagues,” International Review of Modern Sociology 23, no. 1 (Spring
1993): 53.
6
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Soccer (MLS) began play, this research represents a timely opportunity to explore the factors
that led to the formation of the CPL.
Research Approach
The research framework uses a qualitative intrinsic case study design to examine how the
CPL, an upstart professional sports league, cultivated ties with fan-consumers via sport
nationalism, digital media, and fandom. A case study is a research design that is regularly used in
a wide range of disciplines, most often in the social sciences. It is a detailed study of a specific
topic, in which the researcher uses a variety of data collection procedures.7 Rather than linking
case studies to the idea of testing preconceived theories, this research design aims to magnify the
specific subject matter being examined.8 This, in turn, leads to a deeper, more expansive
understanding of the research topic. The primary goal here involves learning about the case
itself, which in turn helps enhance both the researcher and readers’ understanding of the subject
matter at hand.9 It is an appropriate research design when seeking to gain in-depth,
contextualized knowledge about a real-world subject, such as the formation of the CPL.
As with all research designs, case studies have their benefits and limitations. One key
advantage of case studies is that it allows researchers to engage in both qualitative and
quantitative data analysis. On the other hand, case study research has also been critiqued at times
for lacking rigour and providing little ground for generalization. This latter point is typified by

7

John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods
Approaches (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014), 14.
Hans-Gerd Ridder, “The theory contribution of case study research designs,” Business
Research 10 (February 2017): 288-289.
8

9

Ridder, “The theory contribution,” 288-289.
3

the focus of this approach on a single case, which makes it understandably more challenging for
the research to reach generalized conclusions.
The two qualitative methods used to collect data in this research are: semi-structured
interviews; and various primary and secondary sources, most often textual. Semi-structured
interviews allow a certain degree of flexibility for the researcher to gather open-ended data from
interviewees while exploring a particular topic thoroughly. For the purpose of this research,
seven semi-structured interviews were conducted. The interviewees included CPL and Canadian
Soccer Association officials, and soccer reporters. The study also incorporates information from
a variety of sources. These include scholarly publications from a range of disciplines, chief
among them sports sociology and marketing. As well, this study draws on reports and news
articles to further complement the work.
It is important to note that the scope of the research is limited to the league’s inaugural
season in 2019. As a result, the Covid-19 pandemic-affected seasons of 2020 and 2021 are
generally not covered. Furthermore, this study focuses mainly on men’s soccer in Canada, since
the topic of discussion is the launch of the CPL, a professional men’s league.
Chapter Structure
The first chapter examines how the CPL fills a certain void in the Canadian sporting
landscape. It starts by providing background on Canadian sporting culture and highlights how
soccer—the world’s most popular team sport—has historically remained on the margins of the
Canadian sporting landscape. That is partly due to the absence of a top-tier, national domestic
professional soccer league, which in turn, contributed to the decades-long struggles of the men’s
national soccer team. The chapter provides an historical overview of prior, now-defunct,
professional soccer leagues in Canada. While hockey has long been the focal point of Canadian
4

sport nationalism, soccer’s popularity is undeniably on the rise. The sport’s global nature,
changing patterns of immigration, and sky-high youth participation rates have contributed to the
growing appetite for soccer in Canada. Despite various warnings against the viability of a toptier professional league, the Canadian Soccer Association and private investor groups
nonetheless began to lay the groundwork for the Canadian Premier League, beginning in the
mid-2010s.
The second chapter considers whether an upstart national league can broaden its appeal to
viewers using a little-known, paywalled streaming service called OneSoccer. The CPL is the first
top-tier, professional sports league in North America to begin operations in the modern digital
era, a period when audiences—particularly younger generations—are growing more accustomed
to livestreaming sporting events. This chapter discusses declining rates of traditional television
subscriptions and explains why users are cutting the cord and switching to digital streaming
services. Just as Netflix proved to be a disruptive innovator, ultimately defeating Blockbuster,
the digital streaming service landscape continues to grow at the expense of traditional television.
However, accessing broad segments of the population remains a challenge for digital streaming
services. With most CPL matches only available via the specialty streaming service OneSoccer,
the dilemma facing the league involves how it can move from the low-subscription margins of
OneSoccer viewership to the mainstream of the Canadian sporting landscape and become a
household name over time.
The third chapter examines the roles played by fans and supporters’ groups in the
sporting culture of the CPL, with an emphasis on local identity. The chapter begins by asking
what it means to be a sports fan and explains the concepts of fanship, fandom, and team
identification. Research shows that being part of a fan community is not just about supporting a
5

team. It is also about acquiring a sense of belonging. The importance of rivalries in fan culture is
also discussed. The chapter then explains the significance of locality for fan communities. Teams
can emphasize their local roots by promoting homegrown players in their squads and adopting
locally resonant team names. The CPL has also implemented a strict player quota for Canadian
nationals, a provision that guarantees the league a strong Canadian flavour. Finally, the chapter
looks at the influential roles that supporters’ groups have played in building up the CPL.

6

Chapter 1: Sport Nationalism
For decades, Canadian soccer players did not have the consistent opportunity to play
domestically at the professional level, effectively stunting the growth of the sport in the country.
Without the necessary professional opportunities for young Canadians, the men’s national team
has performed poorly from the 1960s until very recently. The launch of a top-tier, national
domestic soccer league was long overdue, as it enables these athletes to play professionally on
home soil and creates a long-awaited pipeline of homegrown talent in support of the national
team. Yet, unlike many countries around the world, Canada is not known as a soccer-loving
nation. The Canadian professional sports landscape includes seven National Hockey League
franchises, a Major League Baseball team (Toronto Blue Jays), a National Basketball
Association team (Toronto Raptors), nine teams in the Canadian Football League, as well as
three Canadian-based Major League Soccer teams. The Canadian Premier League (CPL) faces a
significant challenge navigating this heavily crowded sports market, especially since some of
these leagues have existed for more than a century and are well-known entities. In fact, it might
take several years for the CPL to gain a foothold in the Canadian sports market.10 Moreover,
Canadian sport nationalism has historically revolved around hockey, which represents another
obstacle for the CPL to overcome. For it to do so, it must first heed the warning of a long line of
professional soccer leagues that have failed in Canada. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss
the theme of Canadian sport nationalism and examine the prior context of professional soccer in
Canada, while also analyzing specific factors that gave rise to the CPL.

Michael Leach, “Canadian Premier League takes formative steps with open tryouts,”
Sportsnet, October 10, 2018.
10
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Soccer’s Global Impact
As a sport, soccer’s worldwide popularity and the passion and fanaticism it evokes
among global and local audiences is simply unmatched. Its immense appeal can be partly
attributed to the sport’s ability to bring together people of various nations, cultures, races, and
ethnicities. No other sport possesses an impact as considerable or as comparable. With annual
revenues in the billions, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)—the
governing body of the sport—reported in 2019 that there were at least 128,983 professional
players and 3,903 professional clubs in existence around the world, operating in more than 200
countries.11 FIFA currently has 211 member associations, which is 18 more than the number of
United Nations member states. Moreover, FIFA’s flagship tournament, the World Cup, is ten
times bigger than the Olympic games in terms of popularity and viewership.12 The 2018 World
Cup was watched by a record 3.5 billion people in 2018, when the competition was hosted by
Russia. For context, that is more than half of the world’s entire population.13 Unsurprisingly,
soccer is the most popular sport in 226 countries worldwide. In fact, there are only 35 countries
where soccer is not the dominant national sport, with Canada being one of them.14 In 2018, 205
countries had top-tier, national domestic leagues, with the only exceptions being Liechtenstein,
Mali, Montserrat, Sierra Leone, Yemen, and Canada.15

11

FIFA, Professional Football Report 2019 (2019), 4.

12

Joe Kidwell, “226 countries can't be wrong,” Bleacher Report, November 14, 2008.

13

FIFA, 2018 FIFA World Cup: Global Broadcast and Audience Summary (2018), 4.

14

Kidwell, “226 countries.”

15

FIFA, Professional Football, 4.
8

Hockey’s Status in Canada
A national sport is generally regarded as an intrinsic aspect of a nation’s culture. In
Canada, hockey is more than a sport. In 1994, the National Sports of Canada Act received royal
assent, making hockey and lacrosse the country’s two official national sports. Hockey is a sport
that Canadians invented, and it has become a powerful national symbol—a true marker of
Canadian identity.16 At the same time, Canada is the only country in the world where hockey is
the de facto national sport. While hockey holds an important place in some European countries,
like Russia, Sweden and Finland, it is not the national sport. In the US, hockey is only the fourth
most popular team sport, and it lags behind the likes of golf and NASCAR in terms of
viewership and attendance. Canada’s national sport is not only unique but is also one that does
not matter to most of the rest of the world nearly as much it does to Canadians.17
On the men’s side, Canada has won 27 Ice Hockey World Championships, 18
International Ice Hockey Federation World Junior Championships, and 9 Olympic gold medals,
among other successes.18 Evidently, Canada has long prided itself at being the world’s leading
hockey country, which is partly why hockey has long been seen as Canadians’ only real way of
expressing sporting nationalism.19 Canadian athletes and teams have achieved success in other

16

Alan Bairner, Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American
Perspectives (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 123.
Robin Anderson, “Sport and Leisure in Post-Confederation Canada,” in Canadian
History: Post-Confederation, by John Douglas Belshaw (BCcampus, 2020).
17

18

The Canadian women's national hockey team has won 11 International Ice Hockey
Federation Championships and 5 Olympic gold medals, among other successes.
19

Steve Milton, “A 'New' Canadian nationalism through sport,” Hamilton Spectator, June

23, 2017.
9

sports. For instance, Barbara Ann Scott—one of Canada's most legendary figure skaters—was a
four-time national champion, two-time World champion, and 1948 Olympic gold medalist in
ladies’ singles. However, figure skating’s lack of widespread appeal on the global stage meant it
was difficult for Canadians to truly channel their national pride into a sport with only limited
international impact.20 The Toronto Blue Jays also won successive Major League Baseball
championships in 1992 and 1993—a remarkable achievement—although the feat was
accomplished through the use of mostly American players.21 Similarly, when Toronto Football
Club became the first Canadian franchise to win the Major League Soccer championship in
2017, it did so with a predominantly non-Canadian cast of players. The same can be said for the
Toronto Raptors when the team secured its first-ever National Basketball Association title in
2019.
Canada’s high standing in hockey has faced challenges from the US and some European
countries, starting in the 1970s.22 Even though the Montreal Canadiens remained the NHL’s
dominant team, winning eleven championships from 1953 to 1971, Canada’s amateur hockey
players struggled at international tournaments during this period.23 (The rules for international
competitions stipulated that only amateurs were permitted to compete, with professional athletes
barred from playing. In truth, however, the Soviet players’ “amateur” status was only in name, as

20

Milton, “A ‘New Canadian nationalism.”

Alan Bairner, “Sport, Nationalism and Globalization: Relevance, Impact,
Consequences,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences, no. 49 (2008): 45.
21

22

Bairner, European and North American Perspectives, 132.

Steve Paikin, “‘More to it than just hockey’: Revisiting the Summit Series, 48 years
later,” TVO, January 13, 2021.
23
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they were an elite team who played hockey full-time in their country.)24 With the Soviet Union
having become the dominant global force in international amateur competition by the 1960s,
Canada sought to reassert itself by organizing an eight-game exhibition series against the Soviets
in 1972, known as the Summit Series.25 The series elicited intense feelings of nationalism in both
countries, particularly as it took place during the Cold War. The Canadian team was represented
by NHL players, and there was a general expectation that Canada would cruise to victory.
However, it took Canada until the final 34 seconds of the last game to overcome the Soviets, as
Paul Henderson scored the series-winning goal—an iconic moment in Canadian sports history.26
Yet, despite the glory, there was a realization that Canada was beginning to face new
competition in hockey from other countries.27
At the 1998 Winter Olympics in Japan, the Canadian team, led by Wayne Gretzky, failed
to collect a medal, plunging the nation into a state of despair.28 The disappointment was a
bruising one for Canada’s sporting identity, although it also continued to demonstrate how
hockey remained the focal point of Canadian sport nationalism.29 While hockey has largely
remained Canada’s national sporting pastime, the professional side of the sport has turned into
more than just a Canadian game. In the 1980s, Canadians constituted more than 75 per cent of

John Soares, “Cold War, Hot Ice: International Ice Hockey, 1947-1980,” Journal of
Sport History 34, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 208.
24

25

Paikin, “More to it.”

26

Paikin, “More to it.”

27

Bairner, European and North American Perspectives, 132-133.

28

Steve Keating, “Hockey is more than a game to Canadians,” Reuters, January 28, 2010.

29

Soares, “Cold War, Hot Ice,” 214.
11

the players in the NHL, but by 1998, that number had shrunk to 61 per cent. By 2018, Canadians
made up only 45 per cent of NHL players. While Canada remains the most well-represented
country in the NHL, the league is projected to become more American—for the first time ever—
by 2028.30
Importance of Sport
Over the last three decades, the Canadian sport nationalism landscape gradually
expanded. This trend coincided with the Government of Canada investing record sums of money
in high performance sport.31 More recently, Canada has successfully hosted major sporting
competitions, like the 2007 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, the
2015 FIFA Women's World Cup and the 2015 Pan-Am Games in Toronto. Canada will also cohost the 2026 FIFA World Cup alongside the US and Mexico. Hosting sporting events provides a
unique opportunity for Canadian athletes to compete on home soil and showcase themselves to
the nation and the rest of the world. In addition, it plays a role in strengthening the amateur sport
system and helps promote national unity by demonstrating the country’s sporting prowess to the
outside world.32 Besides boosting tourism, hosting sporting competitions also provides cultural,
economic and community benefits, such as capital and infrastructure investments, including the
construction of facilities that can continue to be used by the local population for years after.33

Cork Gaines and Mike Nudelman, “The NHL is on pace to have more American
players than Canadian players in 11 years,” Business Insider, November 18, 2017.
30

Andreja Milasincic, “Winter Sport Nationalism: The Canadian Olympic Press from
Calgary 1988 to Vancouver 2010” (PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 2017), 20.
31

32

Bairner, “Relevance, Impact Consequences,” 45.

33

Government of Canada, Federal Policy for hosting international sport events, 2021.
12

There is also a recognition that successful performance in elite-level sports can encourage
Canadians to participate in sports and recreation, furthering health promotion and national
pride.34 At the 2010 Winter Olympics, both the Canadian men and women’s national hockey
teams beat the US in their gold medal games, with Sidney Crosby’s golden goal in overtime
becoming another iconic moment in Canadian sports history. The Canadian women's national
soccer team’s consecutive bronze medal finishes at the 2012 and 2016 Summer Olympics also
sparked nationalistic passion, particularly as the US were seen as the “villains” in 2012.35 Further
affirmation of Canadian sport nationalism came at the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo when
the women’s national team won the gold medal for the first time ever, defeating Sweden on
penalties.
Struggles of the Men’s National Soccer Team
Nations derive prestige from not only hosting major sporting events but also from being
successful in sport. This is particularly the case with global sports, like soccer, which can help
promote the image of a nation on the world stage.36 Unfortunately, Canada’s accomplishments in
men’s soccer have historically been meagre, with the program reaching its nadir in 2012 after
being walloped 8-1 by Honduras despite only needing a draw to advance to the next round of
World Cup qualifying. In 2014, the Canadian men’s national team was ranked 122nd in FIFA’s
world soccer rankings—its lowest position ever. Even micro nations like St. Kitts and Nevis

34

Milasincic, “Winter Sport Nationalism,” 19-20.

35

Milton, “A 'New' Canadian nationalism.”

36

Anderson, “Sport and Leisure.”
13

placed above Canada.37 Before 2022, Canada’s only appearance at the FIFA World Cup came in
1986, when the country was eliminated in the competition’s group stage without earning a point
or scoring a goal. Canada’s absence from the World Cup spanned more than 35 years. Similarly,
the national team—albeit a mostly U-23 squad—has failed to qualify for the Olympic Games for
almost four decades. Since 1948, Canada competed only twice in the Olympics, in 1976 and
1984. The men’s national soccer team has enjoyed only limited success during these decades. As
noted above, Canada qualified for the 1986 World Cup by winning the Confederation of North,
Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) Championship in 1985, the
biennial continental tournament between North American countries. Canada’s victory then was
described as “the greatest triumph in Canadian soccer history.”38 In 1990, the competition was
restructured and rebranded as the CONCACAF Gold Cup. A decade later, Canada shocked the
soccer world by winning the 2000 Gold Cup, despite only qualifying for the competition’s
playoffs by virtue of winning a coin-toss tiebreaker.
Nevertheless, these sporadic triumphs, until very recently, have failed to produce
consistent success for the Canadian men’s national team. For many decades, Canada’s soccer
program was an abject failure. There were systemic problems on many fronts: the Canadian
Soccer Association’s haphazard leadership; inadequate coaching standards; and a lack of proper
investment and infrastructure in the sport. As well, the absence of a top-tier, national domestic
soccer league factored greatly. When Canada qualified for the 1986 World Cup, it did so with a

37

“Men’s Ranking,” FIFA, October 23, 2014.

38

“That one time Canada made it to the World Cup,” CBC, July 6, 2018.
14

shallow talent pool to draw from and a virtually non-existent development system.39 In fact,
Canada’s qualification to the 1986 World Cup was quite an oddity given the fact it did not have
its own national domestic professional league. The lack of a top-tier national stage consistently
harmed the men’s national team prospects by creating a chasm between youth levels of the game
and the national team.
History of “Professional” Soccer in Canada
Until recently, the history of professional soccer in Canada can be described as scattered
and regional, with prior leagues being “professional” and “national” in name only. In 2005, the
Toronto Star's Dave Perkins wrote: “For whatever reasons, pro soccer, which has been tried a
million times, doesn't go here.”40 Several factors account for this. First, the slower pace of the
sport and its infrequent goals make it less engaging for Canadians, more accustomed to the faster
pace of sports like hockey and basketball. Soccer historian Colin Jose explains: “You have to
concentrate on what you’re watching. There are no natural breaks [in soccer].”41Another factor is
the country’s vast geography and dispersed population centres, which make operating a national
league more expensive. Canada’s harsh winters limit the outdoor playing season, while scant
investment in playing facilities has produced further constraints.42 The lack of funding in the
Canadian soccer system, a win-at-all-costs youth competition system, and the Canadian Soccer
Association’s (CSA) governance structure also produced a sub-par player development system.

Steve Keating, “Soccer: Canada gets a league of its own with CPL launch,” Reuters,
April 26, 2019.
39

40

MacDonald, “Canadian pro soccer.”
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Aside from government grants, a meaningful share of the CSA's operating budget comes from
player registration fees, via the provincial associations it oversees. In 2015, Jason deVos, current
director of development at the CSA, highlighted the flaws with this approach: “Because of this,
the tail wags the dog when it comes to player development. The provinces, rather than the CSA,
hold all the power. The provinces do what their districts want them to do; the districts do what
their clubs want them to do; and the clubs do what their customers want them to do – which is
rarely what is in the best interests of player development.”43 Additionally, the win-at-all-costs
approach in Canadian youth soccer led many underqualified coaches to rely on athletes with
physical attributes like size, speed and strength instead of instilling the fundamental skills that
young players need to properly thrive at the highest levels of the sport.44 Similarly, coaches
within Canada’s national soccer program generally selected more physically developed, athletic
players rather than the more skillful, technical players—who often need more time to develop—
in hopes of achieving instant success. This short-term thinking was practically forced upon
Canadian national team coaches, as their budgets were at risk of being cut if they failed to
qualify for major international competitions, like the World Cup and Olympics.45
One of the earliest “national” leagues was the six-team Interprovincial Professional
Football Association, which formed in Ontario and Quebec in 1913; however, by the end of the
year, only four teams remained. The league renamed itself the Eastern Football League in the
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autumn of 1913 but went defunct a year later.46 In the 1920s, there were two short-lived
leagues—the Inter-City League and the Inter-Provincial League. In 1926, the National Soccer
League (NSL) was created and two years later, it merged with the Inter-Provincial League, while
retaining the NSL name. In truth though, it was more of a regional league since most of its teams
were based in Ontario and Quebec.47 In 1930, the Pacific Coast League was formed in western
Canada. (It remained in existence until 1973 when it merged with the Inter-City and Mainland
leagues to create the BC Soccer League).48 In 1961, the Eastern Canada Professional Soccer
League was formed, which was another exclusively Ontario and Quebec-based league; however,
it ceased operations in 1966.49 This fragmented pattern would continue for more than four
decades.
League Mortality
The following section will analyze the formation and demise of three professional soccer
leagues: North American Soccer League (1968-1984), Canadian Soccer League (1987-1992),
and Canadian Professional Soccer League (1998-2014).
North American Soccer League
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The North American Soccer League (NASL) launched in 1968, with teams located in
both Canada and the United States.50 In Canada, the NASL had teams in Toronto (1968-1984),
Vancouver (1968-1984), Montreal (1971-1983), Edmonton (1979-1982) and Calgary (1981) at
various points during its existence. The league’s most prominent franchise, the New York
Cosmos, signed a slew of legendary players, starting with Pele in 1975. Giorgio Chinaglia joined
in 1976, and one year later, Franz Beckenbauer and Carlos Alberto Torres were also recruited to
the Cosmos. In order to compete, other NASL teams felt obliged to attract global superstars by
spending lavishly, turning the situation into a financial arms race.51 The likes of Johan Cryuff,
Eusebio, George Best, Gerd Müller, Geoff Hurst, Gordon Banks, and Bobby Moore all joined
the league, which attracted significant media attention and widespread interest in the league.
While the NASL’s popularity peaked in the late 1970s, there was also a downside, as Ted
Howard, the league’s former executive director, noted: “Pele had come and now there was all of
this excitement and people had to get players, and they overpaid for them.”52

There were underlying financial problems with this approach, as teams were spending, on
average, 70 per cent of their budgets on player salaries. In comparison, National Football League
teams devoted only 40 per cent of their budgets to player salaries in 1980.53 At the same time, the
NASL was expanding rapidly, rising from nine clubs in 1973 to twenty in 1975. This expansion
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strategy was not fiscally sustainable, given that the league’s average attendance was under
15,000 per game, with some teams averaging less than 5,000 fans a game. With dwindling
attendance, low television viewership and disappearing network television contracts, revenues
became scarce.54 As the NASL became more cash-strapped and desperate, anyone willing to pay
the franchise fee for an expansion team was permitted to join the league. The league office’s lack
of oversight and control was quite apparent, as many incoming owners had very little knowledge
of the sport.55 As well, many NASL teams played on sub-par playing surfaces, often
reconfigured baseball diamonds or football fields, which made for makeshift, hard pitches with
odd geometric dimensions. The league did not recognize that soccer-specific venues were better
suited for generating authentic, soccer-friendly atmospheres for supporters.56 The NASL faced a
collective deficit of approximately USD $30 million in each of 1980 and 1981, and all of its
teams were losing money.57 Consequently, several teams folded, and in 1984, the league ceased
operations.58

Canadian Soccer League
In 1987, following the collapse of the NASL, another attempt was made to launch a
professional soccer league, although this time it was a Canadian-based one. On this occasion, the
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Canadian Soccer League (CSL) was formed, and it operated as the country’s nationally licensed,
Division I professional soccer league.59 Given the previous failures, the organizers took a more
cautious approach, relying largely on existing teams from provincial leagues, while
implementing a salary cap of $300,000 per team.60 During the inaugural season, the league
consisted of two four-team divisions. In the West Division, there were: Calgary Kickers,
Edmonton Brickmen, Vancouver 86ers, and Winnipeg Fury. The East Division was comprised
of: National Capital Pioneers, Hamilton Steelers, Toronto Blizzard, and the North York
Rockets.61 Initially, there was optimism, with the CSL described as “the first attempt to form a
truly national soccer league in Canada.”62 However, soon after, it encountered significant
financial difficulties due to travel expenses and declining spectatorship.63 Average player salaries
were a paltry $7,500 per season, but even so, teams still struggled financially.64
Even the league’s most successful organization, the Vancouver 86ers, which consistently
led the league in attendance, could not escape money problems. After making a small profit of
$580 in 1987, the team posted four consecutive years of losses: $80,469 (1988), $49,280 (1989),
$147,078 (1990), and $56,718 (1991)—totalling $333,545. As the CBC’s Barry McDonald said
in 1992, “[it is] small wonder the league is in dire straights when its model franchise can’t get
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out of the red.”65 With financial problems mounting and declining attendance, several teams
folded after the 1991 season. In 1992, Bob Lenarduzzi—a former Canadian international player
and coach who also managed the Vancouver 86ers—warned that the league was in dire financial
straits. He added that “if we’d had more business type owners, I think they would have been a
little more realistic and teams would’ve lost less money as a result.”66 Left with only six teams in
1992, the CSL went defunct in 1993, leaving Canada without a top-tier, national domestic soccer
league once again.

Canadian Professional Soccer League
In 1998, the Canadian Professional Soccer League (CPSL) was formed, starting with an
all-Ontario division in 1998.67 The CPSL’s eight founding members were: London City, Toronto
Croatia, St. Catharines Wolves, North York Astros, Glen Shields, Mississauga Eagles, Toronto
Olympians, and York Region Shooters.68 From a player development perspective, the CPSL was
designed as “a stepping-stone to the next level.”69 It aimed to become the country’s Division II,
multi-provincial—and eventually—national professional soccer league. Its goal was to follow
the Canadian Hockey League’s (CHL) blueprint as an umbrella organization. At the time, the
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CHL had 54 Major Junior A teams in three separate conferences (Western Hockey League;
Ontario Hockey League; Quebec Major Junior Hockey League) competing for a national title.
Similarly, the CPSL’s vision was to create regional divisions, with the winner of each division
competing in a traditional playoff format for the overall league championship.70 However, the
CPSL initially adopted an ultra-cautious approach in terms of expansion to ensure its survival.
The league commissioner, Vince Ursini, highlighted this strategy when he said: “Several owners
have been involved in different professional leagues over the last thirty years. They've seen the
demise of all our predecessor leagues…our goal as a league has been viability, stability,
longevity. And the only way we maintain that is by making sure we maintain high standards.”71
The Canadian Soccer Association considered strengthening the professional soccer
structure in Canada by creating a two-tier system in 2001. Not coincidentally, this happened in
the same year that former FIFA President Sepp Blatter sounded a note of caution during a visit to
Toronto, warning: “You [Canada] must do something with your professional soccer… and you
mustn’t count on the United States, [because] they have their own interests.”72 The Canadian
Soccer Association sought to create a domestic, Division I professional league, named the
Canadian United Soccer League, by partnering with Canadian teams in the US-based United
Soccer League (A-League), and by forging an alliance with the Canadian Professional Soccer
League—which would be recognized as the Division II league in this setup.73 However, the plan
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never came to fruition. Ursini later accused the national governing body of having “done little or
nothing for professional soccer.”74 Nick Bontis, president of the Canadian Soccer Association,
refuted this notion: “A lot of people have [always] wanted professional soccer in Canada, but
you’ve got to understand that it is not Canada Soccer’s [CSA] responsibility. Canada Soccer’s
responsibility is to govern and grow the game, not to pay expansion fees and finance professional
leagues—that is the role of private investors.”75
In 2005, Major League Soccer (MLS) expanded into Canada for the first time, awarding a
franchise to Toronto, later named Toronto FC.76 In 2006, the Canadian Professional Soccer
League rebranded itself the Canadian Soccer League (CSL)—the same name as the previous
league that went defunct. In 2010, the CSL was awarded full membership in the Canadian Soccer
Association and became sanctioned as the Division III professional league in the Canadian
soccer pyramid.77 By this point, MLS had effectively gained Division I status in Canada, while
the United Soccer League First Division, which succeeded the A-League, had become the
Division II level. The CSL was basically identified as the missing bridge between the amateur
and top-tier professional level in the Canadian soccer system.
Match-Fixing Scandal and Subsequent De-Sanctioning
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In 2012, the CBC reported that the Canadian Soccer League was mired in a match-fixing
and illegal betting scandal involving a European crime syndicate.78 (Match-fixing is the illegal
manipulation of a sports match through a variety of methods, including player bribery.) It is fair
to wonder how this could have occurred in Canada, which ranked as the tenth least corrupt
country in the world at the time, according to Transparency International.79 Since the CSL was a
little-known league, the criminal activity went initially undetected by Canadian sports authorities
and law enforcement agencies. Another factor was that the league’s players were generally
poorly paid, with some only making around $5,000 per season, making players more susceptible
to bribery. The CBC reported that in a 2009 match between the Trois-Rivières Attak and Toronto
Croatia, a bribe of €15,000 was paid to some Toronto Croatia players to intentionally lose the
game. Toronto Croatia lost 4-1, despite being one of the best teams in the league.80 This matchfixing affair became one of the biggest corruption scandals to hit professional soccer in Canada.
Francesco Baranca, the secretary general of Federbet—an anti-match fixing European
organization—subsequently lambasted the league, calling the CSL “a disaster.”81 At a later
Integrity in Sport conference, Interpol revealed that between 2010 and 2013, approximately $100
million had been wagered on CSL matches using legitimate betting houses.82

Ben Rycroft, Alex Shprintsen, and Joseph Loiero, “Exclusive: Canadian soccer an easy
target for match-fixing,” CBC, September 12, 2012.
78

Declan Hill, “Semi-pro Canadian Soccer League a hotspot of match-fixing,” Toronto
Star, December 12, 2016.
79

80

Rycroft, Shprintsen, and Loiero, “Exclusive: Canadian soccer.”

81

Hill, “Semi-pro Canadian.”

82

Ben Rycroft, “CSA cuts ties with Canadian Soccer League,” CBC, January 31, 2013.
24

In February 2013, a few months after the CBC report, the Canadian Soccer Association
decertified the Canadian Soccer League.83 The league vowed to “take whatever action necessary
to overturn the decision.”84 In April 2013, the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada
(SDRCC) affirmed that “the Canadian Soccer Association had the legal authority to withdraw
the sanction previously granted to the CSL,” but it asked the national governing body to delay
the decertification until February 2014.85 The CBC subsequently reported that the Canadian
Soccer Association admitted that it was ill-equipped “to tackle the domestic match-fixing
problem.”86
The Problem with Major League Soccer
Without a successful national professional league, Canadian soccer players were left
deprived of opportunities to showcase their abilities on home soil, leaving them with few
options. Even the addition of Major League Soccer (MLS) franchises in Toronto (2007),
Vancouver (2011) and Montreal (2012) failed to serve the interests of Canadian players. MLS is
sanctioned by the United States Soccer Federation as it is a US-based league. Its rules allow each
team to have eight “international” roster spots. When the league expanded to Canada in 2007,
Canadian players were treated as “second-class citizens,” as they were designated “international”
players if they played for an American MLS team. On the other hand, the rules stipulated that
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American players were always considered “domestic,” regardless of whether they played for
Canadian or American teams.87 This meant that Canadian players in MLS faced a massive
disadvantage as they were competing for a limited number of international spots on American
teams. In 2017, this issue was partially addressed, as Canadians were no longer classified as
“international” players in the MLS, but only if they met certain criteria. Only those who i) joined
a Canadian or American MLS club academy; or became a member of a Canadian approved
youth club prior to turning 16, and ii) signed their first professional contract with an MLS team
or their United Soccer League affiliate, became eligible to count as “domestic” players.88 This
small step was far too restrictive, since it still excluded most Canadian players from qualifying
for “domestic” status in the MLS.
Another issue is the imbalanced representation that exists in the league. In 2016, even
though Canadian teams made up 15 per cent of the MLS, Canadians represented just over 4 per
cent of the league’s players.89 Colin Miller—the former Canadian men’s national team player—
echoed the need for change, arguing: “We need more Canadian pro franchises to give Canadian
players a chance to play. I was interim Canadian head coach for nine games [in 2013], including
at the [2013] CONCACAF Gold Cup, and seven of our Canadian national team players were
unattached [with no contracts with pro clubs].”90 Rather than truly present itself as a joint, cross-
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border league, the MLS remains an American league that simply happens to have a few
Canadian teams in it. David Clanachan, former Canadian Premier League commissioner,
reiterated this point: "The three MLS [Canadian] franchises have done a phenomenal job in
bringing the game to the next level and teaching Canadians what the game could be like, but they
are still seen as teams that operate in the American league. With no plans to expand, the MLS
teams are not about Canadian players. They are not seen as being representative of Canadian
soccer."91
Dual-Citizen Canadians
The lack of opportunities for Canadians to showcase their abilities explains why many
were forced to look for playing chances abroad or give up pursuing their dreams of becoming
professional soccer players. David Edgar, the former Canadian national team player, explains:
“All the top players would have to leave to go abroad, and a lot of talent went to waste because
they couldn’t get visas in certain countries or couldn’t play in England due to their parents’
background, so it was difficult. I was lucky as my parents were from Newcastle, and I could get
a British passport, but others weren’t as lucky.”92 Edgar’s sentiment is shared by his former
international teammate, Jim Brennan, who adds: "There was nothing when I was younger. A lot
of good players that could have been professional didn't have the opportunity. I was fortunate to
come to the UK and play. But a lot of young Canadians saw their dreams end early as there was
nowhere to go.”93
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Unlike Edgar and Brennan, some talented Canadian players like Owen Hargreaves left
the country’s soccer scene for good. Despite being born and raised in Calgary, Hargreaves—a
midfielder—was persistently overlooked by Canada's national soccer program while in his teens.
After being spotted by Thomas Niendorf, a former East German coach residing in Canada,
Hargreaves left for Germany and later joined Football Club Bayern München in 1997. When the
Canadian Soccer Association came calling a few years later, Hargreaves turned down the
opportunity to play on the national team, electing to represent England instead. (Hargreaves was
eligible to play for England as his father was British.)94 Hargreaves became something of a role
model for other Canadian dual-national players who followed suit, such as goalkeeper Asmir
Begovic.95
After fleeing war-torn Yugoslavia as a refugee, Begovic and his parents eventually
settled in Edmonton in 1999. In 2004, Begovic secured a move to England, joining Portsmouth
Football Club’s youth academy. Unlike Hargreaves, Begovic was part of Canada's national
soccer program, having represented the country at the U-17 and U-20 levels (including at the U20 World Cup in 2007). Yet, despite receiving call-ups to the senior squad, Begovic never played
in a national team match, which made him question his future and the direction of the national
soccer program in Canada. In late 2009, Begovic made his international debut for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, dashing the hopes of Canadian soccer fans. Begovic later said that he had patiently
waited for an opportunity that never came and added: “Going forward, I just didn’t see the future
being that great for Canadian soccer. I wasn’t sure if the people running it were the right
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people.”96 Begovic has played in the English Premier League for more than a decade, featuring
for the likes of Stoke City Football Club, Chelsea Football Club and Association Football Club
Bournemouth. His story was another example of the Canadian Soccer Association’s inability to
convince eligible players with burgeoning reputations to play for the national team.
Growth of Soccer in Canada
Changing patterns of immigration to Canada have altered the landscape of youth sport
participation in the country. Some top sources of immigrants to Canada include Algeria, France,
Colombia, Brazil, Russia, and the United Kingdom, where soccer is the most popular sport.97
Consequently, soccer has become the preferred sport for many first-generation Canadians.98 It
also ranks as the most popular team sport among new citizens in Canada.99 In fact, Statistics
Canada estimates that by 2036, nearly half of the country’s population will consist of immigrants
and second-generation Canadians.100 The CPL’s first commissioner, David Clanachan, highlights
this shift: “Growth is very equal from a gender perspective and football [soccer] is the fastestgrowing sport among new immigrants too. People who come to the country may not know
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basketball, hockey or NFL, but they know football [soccer].”101 As a social institution, sport has
the power to unite people, and soccer—given its global reach—is often a familiar social activity
that can help newcomers integrate into Canadian society.
At the grassroots level, soccer is thriving. According to the 2014 Canadian Youth Sports
Report, soccer was the number one team sport in the country for kids aged 3-17, with 767,000
children playing organized soccer in Canada. In comparison, only 531,000 were registered in ice
hockey that year.102 In fact, Canada ranked tenth in the world for youth soccer participation.103
Many cite cost factors for this, with soccer being a more affordable option for parents than many
other team sports. In 2017, Sportsnet’s Stephen Brunt addressed this point, stating: “The massyouth-participation sport for children in this country is soccer and has been for decades. It’s
simple. It’s cheap. It promotes fitness. It’s relatively safe. Perhaps as a result, viewing interest in
the world game has shown a clear spike among Canadian millennials.”104 However, high youth
participation rates in recreational soccer do not necessarily translate into growing, tangible
passion for the sport. In the US, there were only 50,000 children registered in organized soccer in
1967, but a decade later, that figure had skyrocketed to one million. Yet, the country’s
professional soccer league at the time, the North American Soccer League, did not experience a
similar boom and went defunct in 1984.105 In Canada, however, soccer’s appeal is increasing on
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a range of measurable fronts. Canadians bought more tickets than any other country that did not
qualify for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, and over 29,000 tickets were purchased
by Canadians for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil—again, the highest total for any noncompeting nation.106 In March 2016, a record-breaking attendance mark for a national team
game on Canadian soil was set during the men's 2018 World Cup qualifying match against
Mexico, when 54,798 people attended BC Place in Vancouver.107
The Easton Report
The Rethink Management Report— commonly referred to as the Easton Report—was a
study released in 2012, led by former Canadian national team player James Easton. The primary
aim of the study was to examine the economic and logistical feasibility of creating a new
national, Division II professional league, and to determine how the country’s player development
system could be improved to create a sustainable pathway for young Canadian soccer players to
reach an elite level.108
The main takeaway from the report was that a new national Division II professional
league would not be viable “due to a lack of suitable venues, competition from other leagues and
uncertain consumer demand.”109 In fact, the report conservatively estimated that a hypothetical
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ten-team professional league in Canada would incur combined losses of more than $10 million a
season. The report noted that Australia’s top-tier professional league, the A-League which
launched in 2005, had lost AUS $47 million from 2010 to 2012. The report also noted that Major
League Soccer had only recently become financially stable after operating for twenty years; it
warned that “the continued operation of a professional league in Canada that utilizes existing
playing venues would require investors who are willing to incur losses for a significant period of
time.”110
Instead, the report proposed a new model of development at the semi-professional level.
It recommended that the Canadian Soccer Association follow the Canadian Hockey League’s
model of regional, semi-professional, development-focused leagues. These leagues would
operate at a Division III level in Canada’s largest soccer markets, and the Canadian Soccer
Association would rely on the provincial soccer associations to oversee them. This setup would
provide players aged 18-23 with a more professional and structured environment, while also
allowing them to compete at a higher level.111 In 2012, the Première Ligue de soccer du Québec
(PLSQ)—a Division III league—was launched in Quebec.112 Soon after, League1 Ontario (L1O),
another Division III provincial league, was founded in 2013. These leagues would enhance longterm player development in Canada while having the league's core group of players consisting of
U-23 players.113
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The Formation of the Canadian Premier League
Despite the Easton Report’s findings, the Canadian Soccer Association voiced support for
a national domestic league in 2014: “Our National Team coaches do not have the benefit of
selecting players who regularly compete in an elite level domestic league. The world’s top
national teams draw from their domestic leagues. The development of a home-grown system in
which our best players can compete is of paramount importance.”114 The national governing
body began consulting and engaging with a few ownership groups, including the Canadian
Football League’s Hamilton Tiger-Cats, in order to assess the economic feasibility of creating a
top-tier Canadian league.115 Former Canadian Soccer Association President Victor Montagliani
(currently president of CONCACAF) met with Scott Mitchell, the CEO of the Tiger-Cats, to
consider the matter. According to former CPL Commissioner David Clanachan, “the story goes
Scott gave Victor all the reasons why it wouldn’t work, and Victor replied, ‘OK, well tell me
how you could make it work.’ Scott replied that the only way [of setting up a top-tier domestic
soccer league] would be if every part of Canadian soccer was part of the process, starting at the
top with Canada Soccer and going down to the provinces at grassroots level. And it went from
there.”116 In November 2016, the league hired its first official employee, naming Paul Beirne as
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its project manager. Beirne had been Toronto FC’s first employee, playing a major role in the
launch of that franchise.117 Mitchell described Beirne as “one of the best soccer business
executives in Canada. He's a very passionate guy about the Canadian concept and the
opportunities for Canadian professional soccer.”118 (Beirne would later become president of the
CPL in January 2018, before stepping down from his role after the league’s inaugural season in
2019.)
A crucial part of the process was determining which potential ownership groups had
deep-enough pockets and ties to their respective local communities, as well as viable stadium
options. Many interested parties were ruled out of the bidding process due to these two stumbling
blocks. The Canadian Premier League (CPL) required prospective ownership groups to have an
undisclosed minimum net worth in order to be considered for a franchise license. The franchise
fee for each of the league’s inaugural seven teams was $3 million.119 (In comparison, a franchise
license in the NFL, NBA or MLB would now be more than US$2 billion.) The CPL’s two
founding teams, announced in 2017, were Forge FC (Hamilton) and Valour FC (Winnipeg). Both
franchises were run by the respective owners of the Canadian Football League’s (CFL) Hamilton
Tiger-Cats and Winnipeg Blue Bombers, and the soccer teams would use the same stadiums as
their CFL counterparts. Other notable CPL team owners include the Southern family (Cavalry
FC), whose estate is worth $2.3 billion; and Carlo Baldassarra (York United FC), founder of the
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Greenpark Group, one of Canada’s biggest real estate developers.120 “We have been able to
attract a very high level of investor in terms of net worth,” boasted Nick Bontis, president of the
Canadian Soccer Association.121 Despite being the most popular participatory sport in Canada,
soccer is not the most commercially viable sport, which is “why it took a long time for a group of
private investors to finally come together.”122 Overcoming this hurdle proved vitally important in
the formation of the league.
Conclusion
With soccer’s popularity on the rise and hockey participation declining, soccer has the
potential to challenge hockey as the most popular sport for Canadians. While hockey will likely
remain a key part of Canadian national identity, the launch of the Canadian Premier League
(CPL) represents a transformational moment in the Canadian sports landscape. However, for
soccer to become ingrained in Canadian national identity, it needs the sort of magical moments
that stir imagination and inspire a nation—like Henderson’s game-winning goal in the 1972
Summit Series or Crosby’s golden goal at the 2010 Winter Olympics. For the men’s national
soccer team, these moments, until very recently, have been sorely lacking. Without a national
domestic professional league, Canada has lagged behind the rest of the soccer world for decades.
The formation of the CPL provides Canadian players with a clearer path to playing at the
professional level, while cultivating a stronger professional soccer industry in Canada.
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Chapter 2: Digital Media
On February 20, 2019, Canadian Soccer Business signed a ten-year, multi-million-dollar
broadcasting rights agreement with Mediapro—a global media communications company based
in Barcelona—worth a reported $20 million per season.123 (Canadian Soccer Business is an
entity representing several core national soccer assets in Canada, including the Canadian Premier
League.) Mediapro is a world leader in content creation and sports production, and in 2020, it
recorded annual revenues of €1.1 billion.124 All 100 Canadian Premier League (CPL) matches
during the 2019 inaugural season would be available on Mediapro’s nascent over-the-top (OTT)
streaming service, OneSoccer.125 OTT streaming services, like Netflix and Amazon Prime
Video—among others—are delivered to consumers over the Internet by third party content
delivery services, rather than traditional multichannel television providers.126 Twenty of these
matches were also simulcast and available for free via the CBC’s website and its own OTT
streaming service, CBC Gem. Ten of these twenty games were additionally broadcast on the
CBC’s television network, although the network did not pay a rights fee or contribute to
production costs.127 However, the vast majority of available CPL games would require a paid
subscription to OneSoccer. For decades, a subscription to a package offered by a traditional
multichannel television provider was required for fans to legally watch live sports. But, sports
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coverage is changing as OTT streaming services have gained more traction in recent years. The
deal with Mediapro is the product of multiple factors, including: the disruption of OTT streaming
services; the continued acceleration of cord cutting; the added value of sports OTT streaming
services; a lack of interest among traditional networks; and the target audience of the league.
Pay-TV
The pay television (or “pay-TV”) model is coming under severe pressure from disruptive
innovation. Broadly speaking, pay-TV refers to subscription-based television services offered by
traditional multichannel providers. The pay-TV business model requires consumers to subscribe
to television packages and to rent or buy one or more pieces of equipment, like a set-top box or a
satellite dish receiver.128 Media companies have two primary revenue streams through pay-TV—
advertising and subscription fees from customers.129 But rapid technological advancements and
newer viewer behaviours have transformed the television broadcasting industry, starting in the
late 2000s. The Internet’s effect on the industry cannot be overstated.130 Michael Strangelove
argues that pay-TV’s stubborn insistence on maintaining its outdated business model in today’s
digital world has placed it at a severe competitive disadvantage.131 Before further examining the
decline of pay-TV, it is important to first consider how OTT streaming services rose to
prominence.
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Netflix dooming Blockbuster Video
In the early 1990s, Blockbuster Video was a multi billion-dollar company and the world’s
biggest video-rental chain. However, an important part of its business model was its dependence
on penalizing customers by charging late fees. Recognizing this flaw in Blockbuster’s revenue
model, Netflix launched its DVD rental and sales service in 1998, which mailed videos to
consumers and had no due dates or late fee penalties.132 This also meant that customers no longer
needed to actually go to a physical store.133 Netflix then transitioned into a subscription model—
a ground-breaking shift at the time—which allowed consumers to rent DVD’s online for a flat
monthly fee.134 Without the high costs of retail locations, on top of the added convenience and
flexibility on offer, Netflix began to pose a serious threat to Blockbuster’s existence. When
Blockbuster started its own by-mail subscription service in 2004, it was already too late.135 As
Blockbuster’s demise deepened as a result of its failure to adapt quickly, Netflix further
transformed the video rental industry by launching its revolutionary OTT streaming service in
2007.136 This not only sealed Blockbuster’s fate (which filed for bankruptcy in 2010), but it also
launched the process by which Netflix and other OTT streaming services targeted the television
broadcasting industry, and more specifically, pay-TV.

Greg Satell, “A Look Back At Why Blockbuster Really Failed And Why It Didn't
Have To,” Forbes, September 5, 2014.
132

133

Satell, “A Look Back.”

Todd Davis and John Higgins, “A Blockbuster Failure: How an Outdated Business
Model Destroyed a Giant,” Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies, (2013): 3.
134

135

Davis and Higgins, “A Blockbuster Failure,” 4.

Cynthia Littleton and Janko Roettgers, “Ted Sarandos on How Netflix Predicted the
Future of TV,” Variety, August 21, 2018.
136

38

Digital Streaming and the Steady Decline of Pay-TV
For many decades, pay-TV relied on having duopolistic control of the market, supported
by advertising revenues and subscription fees, to dominate the sports television broadcasting
industry.137 Two of the largest Canadian media conglomerates, Rogers Communications Inc. and
BCE Inc. (hereon referred to as Rogers and Bell), used their vast resources and financial power
to purchase the often-expensive broadcasting rights of sought-after television programs,
including sporting competitions and movie packages. This, in turn, allowed these big
conglomerates to steadily raise the costs for consumers by increasing subscription fees.138 With
very few alternatives on the market, the media giants knew that consumers were left with little
choice but to pay for their services. However, the emergence of OTT services in the late 2000s
and early 2010s drastically changed the landscape of the television broadcasting industry (Figure
1).
Figure 1: Select OTT services in Canada (pricing as of February 2022)

OTT Service

Year Launched
in Canada

Basic Monthly
Price (in CAD,
excld. taxes)

Owner

Netflix

2010

$9.99

Netflix

Crave

2014

$9.99

Bell Media

Prime Video

2016

$7.99

Amazon

Youtube Premium

2018

$11.99

Google

Paramount Plus
(formerly CBS All
2018
Access)

Viacom CBS
$5.99

Michael Schneider and Kate Aurthur, “R.I.P. Cable TV: Why Hollywood Is Slowly
Killing Its Biggest Moneymaker,” Variety, July 21, 2020.
137

138

Schneider and Aurthur, “R.I.P. Cable TV.”
39

Hayu

2018

$5.99

NBCUniversal

CBC Gem

2018

Free

CBC

Disney Plus

2019

$11.99

Disney

Apple TV Plus

2019

$5.99

Apple

According to Convergence Research Group, 33 per cent of Canadian households in 2019
no longer subscribed to traditional multichannel television providers like Rogers and Bell.139 In
2020, more Canadian households had subscriptions to OTT streaming services than to pay-TV,
with Statista placing the number of OTT streaming service users in Canada at about 23 million as
of 2020. This marked a fairly significant increase from the 19.9 million recorded in 2019. The
figure is expected to grow, as Statista forecasts that by 2025 there will be more than 26 million
OTT streaming service users in Canada (Figure 2).140
Figure 2: Number of OTT streaming service users in Canada, 2019-2025
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This trend toward OTT streaming services is also apparent in the United States. At its
peak in 2010, 105 million households in the US had pay-TV subscriptions; however, in 2013,
American pay-TV lost subscribers for the first time in history.141 In 2019, American pay-TV
experienced its worst consumer loss ever, losing six million subscribers, double the previous
year’s number of cancellations.142 The current number of US households with pay-TV
subscriptions has fallen below 80 million and is projected to further decline to 66.8 million by
2023.143 By 2024, it is estimated that US households without a pay-TV subscription will
outnumber pay-TV households (Figure 3).144
Figure 3: US Pay-TV vs. Non-Pay-TV Households, 2016-2024
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The numbers indicate that American pay-TV is losing an average of 3 per cent of its
subscribers each year, with one in three American households no longer subscribing to pay-TV
(Figure 4).145 In fact, at least three American media conglomerates expect the number of US
households that subscribe to a pay-TV bundle to drop to about 50 million by 2025, further
challenging the viability and sustainability of the pay-TV business model.146 Millions have
switched over to OTT streaming services, abandoning pay-TV and cutting the cord in the
process. But how has this shift occurred, and why is it happening?
Figure 4: Cord-Cutter Households in the US, 2019-2023

A number of factors account for the decline of pay-TV. These include: increasing
installation and rental equipment fees; the skyrocketing cost of programming; and cheaper, often
more convenient OTT streaming service alternatives. Consider the following example. In 2012,
Sportsnet—Rogers’ flagship sports channel—made approximately $17.30 per customer (on an

145

Roku, Cord Cutting in Uncertain Times (2020), 3.

Alex Sherman, “Media executives are finally accepting the decline of cable TV as
they plot a new path forward,” CNBC, October 24, 2020.
146

42

annual subscription), but by 2018, this number had risen to $45.23.147 Similarly, Bell’s marquee
sports network, TSN, earned $26.27 per subscriber in 2012, compared to $43.10 in 2018.148 This
demonstrates the steep increase in subscription fees charged by Sportsnet and TSN. The pay-TV
model has led to a “continuing cycle of increased subscription prices followed by a decline in
subscriptions, which in turn necessitates further price increases.”149 Perhaps unsurprisingly, payTV’s operating revenue in Canada has been consistently falling since 2013 (Figure 5).150
Figure 5: Pay-TV operating revenue in Canada from 2009 to 2019 (in million Canadian dollars)
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The trend of rapidly rising pay-TV subscription costs is also apparent in the United
States. Between 1995 and 2005, the cost of pay-TV subscriptions increased by three times the
rate of inflation.151 Other problems emerged for pay-TV in the early 2010s. The number of payTV households began flatlining as most already had subscriptions.152 Rising costs also meant that
many consumers were unwilling to continue paying for expensive TV bundles that included an
abundance of unwatched channels. In fact, the mean monthly bill for an American pay-TV
subscriber reached a record high of USD $109.60 in 2019.153 As former Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Kevin Martin highlighted, “the average cable
subscriber was paying for more than 85 channels that she didn’t watch in order to obtain the
approximately 16 channels that she does.”154 This is a notion supported by Chris Long, former
programming chief at DirecTV and AT&T, who noted in 2020: “I think it’s 10 years, and there’ll
be a total change of the guard. At some point, people will make that decision of ‘I can get
everything I want [in streaming]. I no longer need to have 180 channels that I only watch 12
of.’”155
Many traditional multichannel television providers belatedly introduced Internet Protocol
Television (IPTV), defined as a wireless service that uses a private, dedicated Internet network to
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deliver live and on-demand TV programs to consumers.156 In Canada, Bell was at the forefront
of this development, having launched its IPTV service, called Fibe TV, in 2010. Rogers
responded in 2018 with its own IPTV service, Ignite TV. Some of the features offered by these
IPTV services include smaller, sleeker set-top boxes, voice-activated remotes and the ability to
record, pause or even restart programs on different devices.157 For the media conglomerates, one
of the main advantages of transitioning to IPTV services is that it requires consumers to continue
paying for program bundles that include high-speed Internet. In other words, Fibe TV is only
available to customers who also subscribe to Bell’s home internet service, and the same applies
to Rogers and Ignite TV. Most traditional multichannel television providers will likely transition
to all-IP networks in the future, although it may take some time to convince longstanding
customers to give up their older, non-IP technologies and switch to IPTV.158 In October 2019,
Rogers announced that it would begin phasing out its non-IP technologies.159
While OTT streaming services provide viewers with a more customized and targeted
experience, traditional multichannel television providers continue to perpetuate a rather
antiquated and costly model—even with IPTV services, like Ignite TV and Fibe TV. Despite
adding television package options that allow customers to handpick a selection of their favourite
channels, these IPTV services still do not properly address the overpriced channel-buffet issue.
Simply put, viewers’ ability to choose OTT streaming services that best suit their preferences has
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upended the need for pay-TV’s big bundles. This has allowed consumers to save significant
sums of money. General entertainment OTT streaming services vary in pricing, but as Figure 1
indicated, most cost between $6 to $12 a month—much less than pay-TV’s bundled television
packages. Moreover, unlike pay-TV, most OTT streaming services do not rely on an advertisingsupported revenue model, which means that they do not interrupt programming with ads or
commercials. Instead, they employ a subscription video-on-demand model, where the revenues
come primarily from users’ fees. In addition, most OTT streaming services do not penalize
consumers with cancellation fees, as there are no contracts.
Challenges with Digital Streaming
Despite certain advantages that OTT streaming services provide, there are drawbacks to
consider. First, there are upfront costs, such as the need for a reliable Internet connection and a
plan with a considerable or unlimited amount of data. Users who have Internet plans with a set
data allowance per month can face overage charges if they exceed their data allowance, which
can be quite costly. In addition, most OTT streaming services cannot be viewed on older, nonsmart TVs, meaning that consumers would need to have a smart TV or access to a portable
media player, gaming console, tablet, smartphone, or laptop. There are ways to add “smart”
features to non-smart TVs; however, in most instances, third-party devices are required, which is
another additional cost. Portable media players, for instance, are able to turn existing, older TVs
into smart TVs, but they range in price, with the cheaper options normally costing in the $40 to
$50 range, while the more expensive ones are valued at upwards of $200. Alternatively, a more
affordable option is to stream on a laptop and mirror the screen and sound onto a television
through the use of an HDMI cord. Yet, despite this being a low-cost approach, it is far from the
easiest or most clutter-free way to do things. I have personally tried this method in the past, and
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while it generally works, there have been instances when the video or the audio did not
simultaneously project through the TV, which can be extremely frustrating.
Another limitation that comes with streaming is the generational and technological
challenge that it poses, which can be a fairly significant hurdle to overcome.160 According to a
2016-17 Deloitte survey of Australian consumers, 78 per cent of seniors aged 65-75 owned a
smartphone, as well as 82 per cent of those aged 55-64.161 Yet, a survey conducted by
researchers at RMIT University determined that while this segment of the population had high
levels of digital device ownership, it only had “moderate” levels of confidence in using them.162
The findings are similar elsewhere. In the US, more than half of the population aged 65 and older
are smartphone owners, but research shows that some seniors face unique challenges with
respect to technology usage.163 These include physical barriers, as well as a lack of comfort and
familiarity when using electronic devices. In a 2015 survey, only 26 per cent of seniors described
themselves as “very” confident when using technology, with approximately one-third saying that
they were “only a little” (23 per cent) or “not at all” (11 per cent) confident in their ability. In
stark contrast, almost three-quarters (74 per cent) of those aged 18-29 described themselves as
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“very” confident when using technology, highlighting the vast technological generation gap that
can—at times—exist.164
In other words, seniors—as a segment of the population—are far more likely to be
“digitally unprepared” in comparison to younger age groups.165 At home, my family and I use an
Amazon Fire TV stick to add “smart” features to our TV in order to access OTT services, like
Netflix. On more than one occasion when I was away at university, there was a software bug
affecting the streaming stick, and my parents were unable to fix the problem, so they called me
for help. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify the issue remotely, so they were deprived of
their favourite programs and sports for a couple of weeks until I returned home and updated the
software. At other times, the streaming stick has frozen and needed to be rebooted, so these
portable media players are not immune from causing issues for users. Others have experienced
similar problems:
Out in Victoria, Paul Hanson says his 69-year-old father, a lifelong Arsenal supporter, all but
stopped watching English soccer after the UEFA Champions League games moved to DAZN
[an OTT sports streaming servive] in 2018. “He was struggling to figure out: ‘How do I get
this on my computer? Or onto my TV? And why can’t I just PVR the game and when I get
home from the office just play it like I’ve been able to for the previous 10 years?’” Hanson
explained.166

Many, like my father or Hanson’s father, have always been accustomed to turning on their TVs
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to watch their favourite sports teams play; however, some are now finding it rather difficult to
master this new, and at times, confusing technology.
The Canadian Premier League (CPL) has set its sights on under-35 fans, the so-called
“digital natives.” With Millennials, Generation Z’s, and Generation Alpha’s representing the
league’s target market, many other Canadians may feel excluded from familiarizing themselves
with the CPL. But the league’s Vice-President of Marketing Roy Nasrallah is unapologetic about
the reasoning behind this strategy: “We want to go for younger people because we have a young
product. Our players [in the league] are young. From a commercial side, name me a brand
around the world [that] wants to target a 45-year-old…We have to win with the youth to secure
the future. Why [do] brands like Nike, Coca Cola, Apple, and McDonald’s speak to the youth?
Because they’re looking for long-term affinity and loyalty… And you know, when you take this
data and you tell any sponsor, they will run towards you and say ‘I can't believe you have these
numbers.’”167
Another factor to consider involves the digital divide concerning urban and rural
broadband Internet services. While relatively affordable Internet connections exist in most
densely populated areas, access to broadband Internet remains out of reach for many in rural and
small-town areas. Reporter Kevin Laramee highlights this divide: “Broadband internet is not as
widespread as city dwellers would believe. I know people who live not that far away from a big
city, and they’re still downloading a picture an hour.”168 It is important to understand what
constitutes “high-speed Internet.” According to the Canadian Radio-television and
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Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), “speeds of 50 Mbps download and 10 Mbps upload
reflect what is needed for Canadians to be fully engaged online.”169 In 2017, the CRTC estimated
that only 37 per cent of Canadians living in rural areas had access to high-speed Internet,
compared with 97 per cent of urban homes.170 This figure was even lower (24 per cent) for
households in Indigenous communities.171 Upload speeds for Canadians residing in rural and
remote areas were—on average—ten times slower than for those living in urban centres, while
download speeds were also considerably slower.172 This presents a significant challenge for OTT
applications, as fast upload speeds are necessary for streaming services to properly work. The
same rule applies for cloud storage, video calls, online gaming, and many other productivity
apps. While the federal government says that it will ensure that 98 per cent of the Canadian
population has access to high-speed internet by 2026, the current available speeds in large
swathes of rural Canada simply do not support uninterrupted streaming.173
Low population densities in rural areas make it quite costly to provide high-speed
Internet connectivity for people living there. While urban areas may have hundreds of customers
per kilometre, the opposite applies to rural and remote areas, where there may just be one or two
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customers per kilometre.174 Nevertheless, the urban-rural digital divide needs to be addressed to
ensure equal access for those living in sparsely populated areas. The case of Paul Stubbens
highlights a problem all-too familiar to rural residents in Canada:
Stubbens, who now lives just outside of London, Ont., doesn’t have home Internet service
robust enough for him to watch DAZN stream on his 70-inch TV. “Going to online-only
access is taking a step backward,” he suggested during a phone interview. Stubbens can watch
the games on his iPhone, using cellphone data instead of his home Internet, but once he tries
to send the signal to the TV, everything just begins to buffer and seize. Besides, he can’t
watch many games that way before hitting his 100-gigabyte-a-month cellphone-data limit.
Living where he does, he explained, it’s “physically not possible,” to watch the games on a
TV that receives its signal from the Internet.175

Even in urban areas that generally have more reliable Internet service, there are occasions when
the connection lags or cuts out altogether, which means that streaming is affected. Non-IP
technologies, like cable television, did not have to contend with issues of that nature as they were
not reliant on the Internet.
Another issue concerns what Deloitte labels as “subscription fatigue.” A recent poll
found that 47 per cent of US consumers believe that there are too many streaming options in the
marketplace.176 Similarly, a study which surveyed more than 6,000 consumers across the US,
Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands, showed that 70 per cent of consumers felt overwhelmed
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by the growing number of subscription services needed to watch their preferred programming,
with 87 per cent worrying that this overabundance of choice will soon become too expensive.177
Live Sports
Live sports have long been viewed as the primary motivator for many households to
maintain pay-TV subscriptions, particularly as sporting events are among the most prominent,
must-see, live programming nowadays. In 2018, Nielsen’s top-rated live programs showed that,
in terms of same-day viewership, 89 of the top 100 US broadcasts were live sports.178 Moreover,
in 2017, 81 per cent of American sports fans subscribed to pay-TV, with 89 per cent saying that
watching sporting events live is essential.179 However, 82 per cent of those surveyed also
indicated that they would completely cancel or reduce their TV packages if it were possible for
them to watch their preferred sports via OTT streaming services.180 As a result, Disney has
heavily invested in acquiring sports media rights for its dedicated sports streaming service,
ESPN+. ViacomCBS also provides a wide range of live sports content through its newly
rebranded OTT service Paramount+ (formerly CBS All Access), and WarnerMedia’s OTT
service, HBO Max, is ultimately anticipated to feature live sports as well.181
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The landscape in Canada is not dissimilar. In 2019, only 3 per cent of Canadians
subscribed to a dedicated sports OTT streaming service.182 While this figure has certainly
increased since then, the reality remains that most Canadian sports fans continue to watch the
bulk of their preferred live sporting events through traditional pay-TV services. Yet, sports
fans—across all groups—are placing an increasing emphasis on “convenience,” as a Deloitte
survey found that this factor was nearly 2.5 times more important than most other attributes,
while millennials rated it as the most important factor.183 (The three most important factors
among all fan groups were picture quality, convenience, and the ability to use an on-demand
function.)184 This helps explain why traditional multichannel television providers like Rogers and
Bell are now offering their own dedicated sports OTT streaming services via their sports
specialty channels. Both Sportsnet and TSN now provide a dedicated sports OTT streaming
service that gives viewers full access to their associated network’s linear content. Rogers
launched Sportsnet Now in 2016, and Bell followed suit in 2018 with TSN Direct and the
French-language RDS Direct, allowing consumers without a pay-TV subscription to sign up.
Evidently, the emergence of dedicated sports OTT streaming services has managed to disrupt the
traditional sports broadcasting industry by providing consumers with a relatively cheaper, ondemand, and more personalized viewing experience, which has alleviated the financial burden
for many sports fans.185 With sports fans now able to subscribe to many OTT streaming services
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that best suit their needs, they can avoid paying for pay-TV’s old, overpriced and needless
channel-buffet bundles.
Increasing Competition in the Sports Broadcasting Industry
Traditional multichannel television providers are expected to face increasingly tough
competition from OTT streaming service challengers to acquire media rights for sports
leagues.186 In 2016, Twitter entered the sports broadcasting market by negotiating a cut-price fee
of USD $10 million with the National Football League (NFL) to globally stream ten Thursday
night games, a non-exclusive agreement as the games were also broadcast on network
television.187 In 2017, Amazon made its first foray into the industry and acquired the rights from
Twitter (to the same global streaming package), successfully outbidding Facebook and Youtube.
However, it paid USD $50 million—five times more than what Twitter had paid.188 Since then,
Amazon has renewed the deal multiple times, most recently signing a USD $1 billion per season
agreement—for eleven years—with the NFL for the exclusive rights to 15 “Thursday Night
Football” games, starting in 2022.189 (Although the games will still be available on broadcast
television in local markets, this deal marks the first time that NFL games will be exclusively
provided by an OTT streaming service.)190 Facebook, for its part, streamed 20 non-exclusive
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Major League Baseball (MLB) games during the 2017 regular season and followed that up by
paying more than USD $30 million to exclusively stream 25 MLB games worldwide in 2018—
free of charge and supported by ads.191 Facebook also landed the full exclusive rights in the
Indian subcontinent to stream Spain’s top-flight soccer league, La Liga, as well as 32 UEFA
Champions League matches in Latin America from 2018 to 2021. However, Facebook declined
to renew both deals, and it only streamed six, non-exclusive MLB games in 2019.192
In fact, social media companies like Facebook and Twitter have cooled their interest in
livestreaming sports, with Facebook’s Director of Sports Media and League Partnerships Rob
Shaw admitting that “traditional media rights deals like these aren’t compatible with our current
video business model.”193 Nevertheless, many OTT streaming services remain determined to
fend off competition from pay-TV operators and traditional broadcasters in order to purchase
sports rights. The Canadian Premier League’s Director of Licensing Jim Neish adds that “if you
research over-the-air television ratings across [almost] every league right now, they’re on the
decline,” which helps explain the shifting landscape.194 In order to increase their revenues, some
sports leagues—like the NFL—are even selling secondary digital streaming rights to
complement their traditional televised broadcasts.
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DAZN
The global dedicated sports OTT streaming service DAZN (pronounced Da-Zone) is one
of the biggest players in the market. DAZN first launched in Austria, Germany and Switzerland
in 2016, before doing so in Canada in 2017. It is owned by the billionaire Sir Leonard Blavatnik
and is operated by the UK-based and privately-run DAZN Group Limited. DAZN’s rapid
worldwide expansion has been bold from a financial perspective.195 Broadly speaking, its
business model is similar to Netflix’s approach of building viewership through the acquisition of
substantial content while sustaining significant initial losses until it reaches a volume of
subscribers that delivers profitability.196 As of April 2019, DAZN’s global media rights
commitments totalled a staggering USD $6.1 billion.197
In Canada, DAZN has become a competitor of Sportsnet and TSN, which previously
enjoyed a duopolistic stranglehold of the sports broadcasting industry. DAZN currently has the
exclusive streaming rights to every National Football League game in Canada, as well as
exclusive Canadian rights to the UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League, and the
English Premier League.198 It also has the out-of-market livestreaming rights for Major League
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Soccer (MLS) games featuring American teams, as well as the on-demand rights to stream the
three Canadian teams’ matches 48 hours after their original broadcast. In addition, DAZN has the
Canadian media rights to some mixed martial arts, cricket, snooker and tennis competitions.
DAZN costs $150 per year ($20 on a monthly subscription), but it allows sports fans to watch
some of the most popular leagues and teams for a relatively affordable cost.
OneSoccer
OneSoccer, which livestreams CPL matches, finds itself in direct competition with
DAZN. Given that DAZN is one of the leaders in professional sports streaming and holds a wide
range of soccer-league media rights, OneSoccer faces a significant challenge in its quest to rival
DAZN. Consequently, OneSoccer’s pricing options reflect its more-limited content offerings. It
offers a monthly subscription fee of $9.99 or a yearly pass costing $99.99.
Figure 6: Select streaming services in Canada with broadcasting rights to marquee soccer competitions (as of
February 2022)

Streaming
Service

Year Launched
in Canada

Monthly Price
(in CAD, excld.
taxes)

Owner

Marquee
Soccer Content
(by
competition)

beIn Sports
Connect

2014

$14.95/month
(yearly option
available for
$99.95)

beIN Media
Group

French Ligue 1,
Turkish Süper
Lig, South
American Copa
Libertadores

2016

Standard:
$14.99/month
(yearly option
available for
$149.99)

Rogers

German
Bundesliga,
English FA Cup,
English FA
Women’s Super
League,

(also available
via fuboTV)
Sportsnet Now
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Premium:
$34.99/month
(yearly option
available for
$249.99)
fuboTV

2016

DAZN

2017

TSN Direct

OneSoccer
(available via
fuboTV)

Select 2022
Canadian Men’s
World Cup
Qualifiers

$12.50/month
(prepaid yearly
at $150 and
three-month
option available
for $40)
$20/month
(yearly option
available for
$150)

FBNK

2018

$19.99
(yearly option
available for
$199.90)

Bell

Spanish La Liga,
Major League
Soccer, FIFA
World Cup,
FIFA Women's
World Cup

2019

$9.99
(yearly option
available for
$99.99)

Mediapro

Canadian
Premier League,
CONCACAF
Champions
League,
CONCACAF
Gold Cup, All
Canadian Men’s
and Women’s
National Team
games

DAZN Group
Limited

Italian Serie A,
Coppa Italia, and
BeIn Sports
Connect and
OneSoccer’s
content
UEFA
Champions
League, UEFA
Europa League,
English Premier
League, Major
League Soccer
(3 Canadian
teams’ games
not available
live)

Mediapro is seeking to differentiate OneSoccer from the competition through extensive
Canadian content. As Figure 6 highlights, OneSoccer not only owns the broadcasting rights to
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the CPL but also all national team games, including the 2022 World Cup qualifiers which
became a very hot commodity. Not too long ago, the Canadian Soccer Association (CSA) had to
buy airtime on traditional television for a network to produce and broadcast games as the
national team consistently struggled through repeated qualification cycles.199 Unlike the
mainstream Canadian sports networks, Mediapro sensed an opportunity and capitalized on it.
“We are investing in Canada, we have new employees, we are producing here. More than 85 per
cent of our content is Canadian. We are trying for gender equity,” says Oscar Lopez, the CEO of
Mediapro Canada.200
But, soccer podcaster David Amoyal says that even though OneSoccer is currently just a
little-known OTT streaming service, it can still prove to be a good home for a league in its
fledgling stages. He adds that the CPL’s current priority should be to develop its fanbase
organically at the grassroots level in order to generate more widespread interest in the product.201
“Let’s assume the CPL is on DAZN right now. Are more people going to watch it because it’s
there, or will they rather watch the Premier League or Champions League games?”202 There are
potential competitive advantages for niche streaming services, such as increased authenticity and
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a more loyal following among their consumers, but people must be aware of their existence in
order for them to succeed, and they must also bring value to their subscribers.203
CPL Viewership
One of the major concerns with the CPL’s broadcasting arrangement with Mediapro
involves how it can increase viewership if most matches are stuck behind a paywall. Will this
current setup only cater to diehard Canadian soccer supporters and ignore casual fans?
OneSoccer’s ratings and subscriptions remain a mystery, as Mediapro—like most other OTT
services—does not publicly release these figures. However, CNBC reported in 2020 that DAZN
had approximately eight million subscribers globally, including one million in the US.204 It is
difficult to estimate how many customers subscribe to DAZN in Canada, particularly as DAZN
purchases its sports rights territorially rather than globally, but Convergence Research Group
puts the number in the low six figures.205 With OneSoccer being a newer service with limited
sports content in comparison to DAZN, it is unlikely that its subscriber count is at DAZN’s level.
There are other ways, however, to gauge the CPL’s popularity. According to Laramee,
one million viewers is considered the benchmark for success in Canadian television ratings, with
one to two million representing an amazing rating.206 The TV ratings for the ten matches that the
CBC broadcast in 2019 on its linear platforms had a network reach of 3,216,000 in total, with an
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average reach per game of 422,000, and an average minute audience of 54,000.207 How does this
compare to other sports leagues’ viewing figures in Canada? In 2017, from April through July,
the MLB’s Toronto Blue Jays averaged 706,300 viewers per game on Sportsnet, while regional
broadcasts of the Toronto Maple Leafs averaged 536,000 viewers on Sportsnet during the NHL
season that year.208 Hockey Night in Canada, meanwhile, drew an average audience of 1.8
million viewers for the 7 p.m. EST game, and 821,000 viewers for the 10 p.m. EST game in
2017.209 Evidently, these numbers are significantly higher than the CPL’s viewership; however,
it must be noted that the CPL is a newly established league. It needs time to gradually build a
strong supporter base and steadily increase its popularity.
Still, with most CPL games not widely televised, there is a risk that a new league will
struggle to grow its supporter base because it is primarily available behind a paywalled OTT
streaming service. At the same time though, Mediapro has provided long-term financial
sustainability for the league with its multimillion-dollar, ten-year contract. Will this reduce the
CPL’s mainstream relevance, as casual fans who might otherwise have caught matches on TV
simply opt to watch something else? It is fair to wonder if Canadian sports fans should be able to
access the country’s top-tier, national domestic soccer league on TV rather than through a lesserknown OTT streaming service. Neish, however, disagrees with this assessment: “You could have
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a terrestrial [broadcast] deal with a TSN or Sportsnet, but it is not necessarily going to guarantee
that people are going to watch your product, so there is a growth and development piece.”210
There are also reasons to be optimistic about the CPL’s growth potential, even without its
presence on the top sports networks or other traditional channels. Some professional sports have
already shifted their strategies to focus on catering to diehard fanbases rather than to seeking new
supporters. This means that instead of broadcasting content on multisport channels and bidding
for airtime on these networks, there is value in having a single, dedicated media home.211 One
reason for this is that traditional sports networks simply do not have the time to tell the story of
an entire league, its teams, or its players. In the US, tennis is moving in this new direction. The
Tennis Channel, which is available as both a pay-TV and OTT streaming service, has gradually
become the specialized hub for competitive tennis. It has so far fended off competition from
sports network giants like ESPN to retain the rights to most major tennis events beyond the
Grand Slams.212 Similarly, Neish points out that the CPL is hoping to appeal to its more fervent
and passionate fans through OneSoccer. These are people who are desperate to support a
domestic product, whether it’s the national team or a national league like the CPL. “It’s more
tailored to the hardcore fan, so right now, our subscription base is geotargeted to a lot of our
existing fans, and the challenge is to grow that. And as the league starts to grow, that will
become a natural progressive piece,” adds Neish.213 Evidently, this strategy requires an
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acceptance that it will take time to build a fanbase. The goal is to steadily increase the league’s
viewership over a number of years, rather than to expect a sudden spike in the short-term.
Another important dimension to consider is the value of getting the kind of exposure that
television networks cannot offer. Andrea Gaudenzi, the chairman of the Association of Tennis
Professionals, believes that in today’s digital age, telling stories about tennis players and their
journeys through documentaries, interviews and videos are key to expanding the sport’s reach.214
For the CPL, an OTT streaming service like OneSoccer can help generate interest in the league
with features about teams and players, rather than simply delivering the games. This was a
fundamental factor in the CPL’s decision to opt for OneSoccer, according to Neish:
One of the pillars of the Mediapro deal is that they’re not just a broadcast partner and that’s
the shift that’s happening. You’re going to more of these multimedia partnerships in
untraditional platforms. We’ve been fortunate that CBC picked up some games, but that
digital platform [OneSoccer] is just ripe with opportunity. It’d be easy to take an over-the-air
deal but what is a TSN or CBC going to invest in shoulder programming outside of covering
our games? Are they going to broadcast every single one of our games to our marketplaces at
the time they’re actually taking place? The trend nowadays is to veer away from the
traditional broadcast partnership. There were all kinds of suitors for the CPL, but I think what
Mediapro brought to the table was a commitment to really buying into growing and
developing the image and brand of the CPL. That is not only from a quality standpoint in
terms of how they produce the broadcast, but also committing to shoulder programming, talk
shows, preview shows and documentaries and all of those things that when you add up the
sum of the collective parts, gives us a bigger voice in the marketplace.215

Given the importance of TV ratings, it is arguable whether Canada’s main sports
networks even wanted to televise CPL games. Nevertheless, OneSoccer can prove—over time—
to not only be a disruptor in the industry but an ideal partner for a league in its fledgling stages.
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After all, Lopez would like OneSoccer to become “the destination point for soccer in this
country.”216
Conclusion
The future of sports broadcasting is seemingly headed in only one direction. In fact, one
of America’s most viewed sports networks, NBC Sports Network, shut down at the end of 2021,
with NBCUniversal moving a significant portion of its sports content to its OTT streaming
service, Peacock. Adam Epstein, Quartz Media’s entertainment reporter, sums up this shift by
writing: “The direction in which the industry is headed is clear. If fans don’t start embracing
streaming now, it will soon be thrust upon them.”217 While some users face issues with OTT
streaming services, such as barriers to learning a new technology, hardware compatibility
malfunctions, software bugs, and Internet connectivity problems, the sports broadcasting
industry is belatedly pivoting to the OTT streaming landscape. That is why the Canadian Soccer
Business’ decision to sign a long-term deal with Mediapro to broadcast all CPL games on
OneSoccer can be seen as a forward-looking—albeit risky—move. Unlike sports channels like
Sportsnet and TSN, OneSoccer is not a well-known entity, nor does it have a comparable coastto-coast reach. Moreover, unlike DAZN, OneSoccer lacks premium sports content and
programming to compete on that front. However, the CPL’s target audience skews younger,
while the league is primarily catering to a demographic that prefers viewing live sports through
OTT streaming services rather than traditional television broadcasts. Similar to the Tennis
Channel, the CPL is attempting to build longer lasting, closer relationships with its existing
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fanbase by promoting Canadian content to generate additional interest in and passion for its
product, and to subsequently attract more fans in the future.
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Chapter 3: Fandom
Fans and spectators are the lifeblood of sporting organizations. This is not a groundbreaking concept, as most professional leagues that have gone defunct have suffered from
varying degrees of low spectatorship. When the Canadian Professional Soccer League was in its
fledgling stages in 2000, the London Free Press’ Kathy Rumleski wrote: “What the league really
needs is a good fan base.”218 In the end, the league failed to develop the required audience appeal
to remain afloat and eventually folded. Duane Rockerbie, a contributor to the Easton Report,
points out: “So often, what these startup leagues want to do is play games and they think people
will just show up. When they don’t, you fail.”219 Since fans are integral to the success of sporting
organizations, they constitute key stakeholders.220 After all, they not only invest considerable
time and emotional energy into their favourite teams, but they also contribute directly to their
team’s revenues by purchasing matchday tickets, subscribing to watch games, and buying gear
and merchandise. This chapter examines the meaning behind being a sports fan, including how
fans assume roles in terms of their identification with their team, as well as their participation
within the fan community. The chapter then considers the historical significance of locality in
soccer and explains how CPL teams have articulated their local identity in a way that appeals to
their respective populations. The roles played by local communities and fans in the sporting
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culture of the league is also discussed, with a particular focus on the impact of supporters’
groups in the formation of the CPL.
What is a sports fan?
Researchers have consistently highlighted differences between terms like “fans,”
“spectators,” “enthusiasts,” and “followers.”221 Therefore, it is first important to distinguish
between a sport fan and a sport spectator. A “fan” can be defined as an individual with an
abiding interest in a sport, a team or an athlete, whereas a “spectator” is considered to be a
person who attends sporting events, like a match-going supporter, or someone who regularly
watch these events from afar.222 These terms are not generally interchangeable, nor are they
mutually exclusive. For instance, most spectators who attend a game in-person are typically fans
of one of the teams involved. Similarly, fans turn into spectators when they watch a sporting
event. In this chapter, the term “fans” will be used in a generic way to refer to individuals who
are intensely devoted to their team and who demonstrate an obsessed, unwavering loyalty and
passion toward it.223 This is a characterization that researchers Stephen Reysen and Nyla
Branscombe support, noting that “any individual who is enthusiastic, ardent, and [a] loyal
admirer of something can be reasonably considered [to be] a fan.”224 It is also important to note
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that the word "fan" is a shortened version of the term “fanatic,” someone who is obsessed with
something.
Fanship and Fandom
Reysen and Branscombe also note that sport fandom has often been misconstrued with
the concept of fanship. Fanship is a form of personal identity and can be described as an
individual’s loyalty toward a specific team, or as the authors put it, “a fan's personal connection
with a sport team.”225 It is similar to Daniel Wann’s (1997) term “team identification,” which
will be discussed in greater detail below. Fandom relates to a person’s bond with other members
of a group—or imagined community—who share a similar level of interest with the object.
Fandom can be likened to Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory, which broadly explains that a
person's sense of who they are is dependent on the groups to which they belong.226 In truth,
fanship and fandom often overlap as one’s personal identity is generally linked to one’s social
identity.
Team Identification
For fans, identification with a team is reinforced by engaging in supportive and repetitive
consumption behaviours like attending live matches, watching games through a form of media,
and buying team gear. More so than “fans” of clothing or car brands, sport fans exhibit a strong
emotional attachment to their respective teams, which is a rather unique phenomenon.227 Kirk
Wakefield explains this attachment: “Highly identified fans will internalize or adopt the team or
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player’s attitudes and behaviours as their own. If you are highly identified with a team, you feel
good when the team wins, and bad when the team loses. You believe the team is a representation
of who you are to yourself and to others. You practically feel as though you are part of the
team.”228 As Wakefield points out, when a fan watches their team lose, they are likely to
experience intense negative responses. This can even include depression.229 They can become so
impassioned with their team that it truly becomes a part of their identity, thus regularly affecting
their emotional state and psychological well-being.230 A fan’s attachment to their team can be
called team identification, which Wann describes as “the extent to which a fan feels a
psychological connection to a team and the team’s performances are viewed as self-relevant.”231
For many, team identification is both a crucial and powerful element of their sense of self.
As professional sport continues to hold significant appeal and influence globally, it is
important to understand the behaviour of fans. Why do they act the way they do? Many nonsports fans simply do not understand fans’ obsession with their teams — “it’s just a game,” they
say. They wonder why sports fans are so enthusiastically devoted to their teams and endure a
rollercoaster of emotions, particularly when it is assured that—barring a tie—for a team to win,
another must lose. While one fanbase feels euphoria as a result of their team’s victory, the
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opposing fanbase, in turn, suffers defeat. Is this a worthwhile investment of one’s time? Wann
describes the uniqueness of being a fan as “a voluntary activity where half of the people aren’t
going to like the product when they’ve finished consuming it. You wouldn’t go see a movie if
you thought there was a 50/50 chance you wouldn’t like it.”232 Evidently, team identification
encompasses more than just rooting for a team to win, because every team eventually loses. That
is just the nature of sport. Wann contrasts this with the following metaphor: “if a pizza restaurant
continually got your order wrong, you’d likely switch to a more reliable parlor. But because
being a fan is so central to people’s identities, people are willing to accept defeat and continue to
be loyal to a team.”233 Highly identified fans are also more likely to have been socialized to sport
from an early age, which is why they view it as more than “just a game.” Instead, it represents
more of a nostalgic experience to them. For many, team identification evokes fond childhood
memories.234
A Sense of Belonging
Another attraction of being a fan is the sense of belonging and social connectedness that
comes from being part of a fanbase, a community in itself.235 Connecting spectators to other likeminded individuals fulfills the natural human need for belonging. This shared identity can exist
in many different forms. For instance, technological advancements in the 21st century mean that
fan communities are no longer geographically bound. Fans can interact with each other on social
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media, online forums, and other web-based communication platforms that are easily
accessible.236 It can also be as simple as seeing a fellow fan or spectator wearing the team’s gear,
thus allowing for an instant connection. Moreover, there is also the social factor that exists at
sporting venues. Arenas and stadiums are easy places for spectators to engage with each other,
while also serving as the “home” base for the entire team—including the fans.237 Even though
members of a fanbase may not actually know each other, the fact that they all root for the same
team represents a common interest between them which makes it easier to socialize within this
community. Sports historian Richard Holt highlights this commonality by explaining that it
offers “a reassuring feeling of being part of something even if the crowd itself were for the
greater part strangers to one another.”238
Wann argues that this is a “very psychologically healthy activity.”239 He adds: “When we
look at motivation for following a sport team, group affiliation is one of the top ones. Identifying
strongly with a salient local team where other fans are in the environment—that’s a benefit to
social-psychological well-being.”240 In fact, studies show that higher identification with a team is
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linked to significantly lower levels of alienation and loneliness and a greater degree of collective
self-esteem and positive emotion.241
It’s not all about winning
Yet, this creates something of a paradox. How can highly identified fans maintain a
positive psychological outlook if they experience significant levels of disappointment when their
team loses? Is the sense of belonging that is fostered by being part of a fanbase enough to
override these intense negative responses? In truth, highly identified fans are not immune from
the negative feelings that arise when their team fails to win. Rather, they often adopt coping
mechanisms, including reflecting on the team’s past glory years, dreaming of future success, or
even pinning their team’s losses on outside forces—like the referees.242 Another defensive
mechanism that highly identified fans rely on is the repetition of games or seasons. There is
always another upcoming game or season.243 These strategies provide them with hope, and over
time, they are better able to cope with their team’s struggles and continue reaping the rewards of
the social connections that stem from their sporting allegiance.244
Rivalries
This sense of community, togetherness and belonging can also exist in other ways.
Members of a fan community do not necessarily have to associate with each other as long as they
possess a shared sense of identity. From this regard, fanbases can be likened to imagined

241

Wang, “Sports Complex.”

242

Wann, “Examining,” 89.

243

Wang, “Sports Complex.”

244

Wann, “Examining,” 89.
72

communities since a fan’s membership to the community is primarily based on an imaged sense
of belonging.245 It is this mentality, or collective imagery, that bonds fans together. These shared
values signal that spectators not only identify with their preferred team but also with the fan
community.246 Moreover, research reveals that identification with a fan community also occurs
when an individual feels connected to other members of the community, while also feeling a
sense of difference from “outsiders”—like fans of other teams.247 In other words, fan
communities can be defined by opposition to other groups and patterns of exclusion, as
Abercrombie and Longhurst argue:
The significance of communities … lies in the way in which people think about their
relationships with other people that they deem to belong to the same community. Critical to
this process of imagination is some notion of a boundary between one imagined community
and another. ‘Community’ is essentially a relational concept; communities are defined in
relation to one another as well as by the quality of the relationships internal to the community.
Therefore, the feeling of being critical to the sense of community is constructed as much by
not belonging to some imagined entity as much as it is by belonging to one.248

Feelings of belonging and exclusion regarding a fan community help explain sporting allegiances
and rivalries. Broadly speaking, almost every team has at least one opponent that it considers to
be its rival. Rivalries are often characterized by intense competition and animosity between the
teams. Research shows that some of the most common rivalry elements between teams in North
American sports leagues include: frequency of competition, defining moments, recent and
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historical parity, geography, relative dominance, competition for personnel, and cultural
similarity and difference.249
In Canada, NHL team rivalries sometimes intersect with the politics of national identity
and cultural resistance. The Montreal Canadiens, for example, have historically symbolized
French Canadian and Quebecois identity. In fact, when the team first formed in 1909, it was
“exclusively for players who [spoke] French.”250 Anglophone Quebec, meanwhile, was
represented by the Montreal Wanderers (1903-1918) and the Montreal Maroons (1924-1938),
while English Canada had the Toronto Maple Leafs.251 The Montreal Canadiens also had a
heated rivalry with the Quebec Nordiques between 1979 and 1995, known as the “Battle of
Quebec.”252 This rivalry took on a form of political symbolism in terms of Quebec sovereignty.
Canadiens’ supporters were viewed as more “federalist,” while Nordiques’ fans were depicted as
more separatist and Péquistes.253 As the NHL’s oldest teams, the rivalry between the Montreal
Canadiens and Toronto Maple Leafs continues to this day, although it is no longer directly
characterized by the cultural and linguistic dualities of Canadian society.254
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Regardless of how they arise, rivalries are a crucial component of fan identity, which is
why professional sports leagues view them as integral. In 2016, Major League Soccer (MLS)
Commissioner Don Garber expressed a similar viewpoint: “rivalries are a big part of our
strategy. Our highest rated television events are our rivalry matches. So, rivalries are
important.”255 Outside of North America, rivalries that stem from conflicts relating to ethnic,
religious or nationalist divisions are more common, especially in places with long histories of
political and cultural conflict. For example, in Spain’s La Liga, issues surrounding regionalism,
separatism, and repressed nationalism are consistent features, with Futbol Club Barcelona
representing Catalonia’s political struggle for independence. In contrast, Real Madrid Club de
Fútbol symbolizes historically Castilian-Spanish nationalism.256 In Scotland, sectarianism is
highly visible in the fierce rivalry between the supporters of Glasgow's two biggest clubs, Celtic
Football Club and Rangers Football Club. Most Celtic fans identify as Catholic, in contrast to the
Protestant Rangers’ supporters.257
Rivalries are also crucial because of the economic value that they possess. They are a
valuable marketing tool designed to hook consumers—sports fans—onto a product. In the MLS,
rather than wait for rivalries to form organically, the league has attempted to create rivalries
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between many of its teams.258 It has regularly relied on one of the most common rivalry
factors—geographical proximity—in its quest to do so. For example, the Cascadia Cup is a
competition between the three teams based in the Pacific Northwest (Vancouver Whitecaps
Football Club, Portland Timbers, and Seattle Sounders Football Club).259 Similarly, the Rocky
Mountain Cup is a competition that pits the Colorado Rapids and Real Salt Lake against each
other. The importance of rivalries can also be seen in how MLS has expanded. New franchises
were added in New York (New York City Football Club in 2013) and Los Angeles (Los Angeles
Football Club in 2014), despite both cities already having MLS teams. This demonstrates the
league’s attempt to create crosstown rivalries in viable markets.
For its part, the Canadian Premier League (CPL) is also promoting and manufacturing
intense competition between some of its teams in order to generate more animosity and passion.
The CPL has billed matches between Forge FC and York United as the “905 Derby,” referencing
their common area code.260 Similarly, games between the two Alberta-based clubs—Cavalry FC
and FC Edmonton—are promoted as “Al Classico,” a play on the “El Clásico,” the name for
Barcelona and Real Madrid matches. These fixtures have also been dubbed the “Battle of
Alberta,” a historic term seen with Calgary-Edmonton matchups in both the CFL and NHL.
Significance of Locality
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Crucial to this discussion is the importance of local identities to sport. Sports teams have
long represented and reflected particular locations and local identities.261 For much of the 20th
century, the local hockey rink was a focal point for the expression of small-town Canadian
identity. This was particularly the case for working class men, as the local rink served as a
cultural site where they could exercise their masculinity.262 In England, a country with a rich and
deep soccer tradition, support for local soccer clubs has been historically strong.263 Soccer clubs
have long been associated with their community, embodying the collective spirit and identity of
the local population. As such, clubs became sites for community representation and provided
their local population with the opportunity to engage in expressions of common identity.264
Prior to the 1950s, logistical and technological limitations ensured that local clubs in
Britain were well supported.265 For instance, midway through the 20th century, there were only
2.2 million private cars in Britain. However, by 1970, this figure had already reached 11.5
million.266 The rapid growth of personal car ownership provided spectators with more
opportunities to travel and watch non-local clubs further away. Another limitation that existed
was the fact that television sets were viewed as luxury items at the time, with only 350,000
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British households able to access a television in 1950. Yet, by 1970 almost every household in
Britain had at least one television.267 The proliferation of television made it possible to embrace a
club to which an individual had no territorial connection. Despite these trends, support for local
clubs continued to remain strong after the 1950s.268 A 1994 study of English Premier League
(EPL) fans found that 65 per cent of respondents remained loyal to their hometown club.269 A
similar study conducted in 2010 also showed that 65 per cent of English Football League (EFL)
fans supported their local club.270 Undoubtedly, there is a relationship that exists between
playing success and the total support a club garners, which helps explains why a few of the
biggest English clubs (e.g., Manchester United Football Club and Liverpool Football Club) have
drawn high levels of support nationally and overseas. For the most part, however, fan support of
local clubs has been and continues to be a fundamental part of the English game, even when it
means rooting for an unsuccessful side.271 As discussed earlier, this is a decision that many fans
and spectators alike willingly make for a variety of reasons.
Team Names
Historically, most English clubs originated with names that represented their
geographical community, such as a town, city, or an area within a city. This meant that clubs
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were, in essence, tasked with representing their local population.272 Some English clubs have
also articulated local identity in team names, such as Arsenal Football Club, which references the
club’s origins among workers of the Royal Arsenal armament factory in Woolwich.273 In the
major North American sports leagues, however, most teams are generally named after the city or
broader geographical area in which they compete.274 Many Canadian Premier League (CPL)
teams, however, are not named after their home cities but after identifiable features of these
communities. For instance, Forge FC evokes Hamilton’s “Steel City” heritage and Valour FC is
inspired by three Winnipeggers who served in the First World War. Similarly, Cavalry FC
honours the Calgary-area’s military history and the first responders and armed service members
who serve the region and country.275
The CPL opted to develop a unique brand identity for such teams using non-traditional,
esoteric naming. CPL Vice-President of Marketing Roy Nasrallah explains this approach: “When
you look at the market from a North American perspective, particularly from a marketing
perspective, [our thinking is] how can you break through the noise and make a statement for a
[new] league when [there are] leagues [that] have existed for 100 years. We want to be unique,
and we want to be authentic.”276 Most people would not recognize that “Forge FC” represents a
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team from Hamilton, but there is a deeper meaning to consider. Hamilton’s historical reputation
has centred on it being Canada's top steel-producing city. Since steel is “forged,” the name
“Forge FC” evokes the city’s industrial roots in order to connect with the local community
through this appeal to heritage.
As mentioned above, another approach to team naming involves adopting regional
identities. Some professional sports teams in North America, like the New England Patriots,
embody such regional naming.277 The Patriots play in the small town of Foxborough,
Massachusetts, with a population of roughly 17,000, about 20 miles from Boston and
Providence, Rhode Island. No other professional football teams play in the New England region,
enabling the “New England” name to represent an entire region and its population. The “New
England” name also boosts its marketability and scope for a fanbase. Pacific FC, the CPL club
based in Langford—one of Greater Victoria’s thirteen municipalities—functions similarly.
“Pacific FC” allows all British Columbians to feel a degree of attachment to the team and
presents the club as the province’s CPL team, thus expanding its reach.278
Local Players
Another factor to consider is that local players help bond a club to its community.279 Fans
generally love seeing local players rise through the ranks to land a spot in their first team. A
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2019 survey of English Football League supporters found that 86 per cent thought it important
for clubs to nurture and promote homegrown talent.280 The English game, however, has become
less rooted in locality in recent decades. During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a strong
emphasis on youth development, which saw clubs regularly promote local or regional players
through their academy systems. Yet, over the last few decades, clubs—particularly those at the
highest levels—have been drawing on national and international players far more frequently.
Consequently, fans have come to expect that their teams will predominantly be composed of
“mercenaries.”281 But, while many top soccer clubs are now globally recognizable brands with
widespread appeal, at their roots, they are still local institutions that represent a place and reflect
the identities of these people. For instance, Athletic Club, a team in Spain’s La Liga, is situated
in the Basque region and only recruits and signs players from the surrounding Basque
Country.282 This trust in local talent is even apparent in Athletic Club’s motto, “Con cantera y
afición, no hace falta importación” (“with home-grown talent and local support, there’s no need
for imports”). By adhering to this tradition, the club has consistently promoted the values and
culture of the Basque people, endearing itself to its fans and local residents.283 It is, however, rare
in the world of professional sports for a team to forge an ethnic identity in the way that Athletic
Club has done.
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Player Quotas
When Major League Soccer (MLS) launched, there was a league-wide mandate to
promote American players. This meant strict limits on the number of international players
allowed, with each team only allowed four foreigners during the league’s inaugural season. MLS
also understood this as a way to build support among fans, who preferred domestic players since
they could relate to them more.284 This approach was in stark contrast to its predecessor, the
North American Soccer League (NASL) and its free-spending strategy of recruiting foreign
players. Nick Owcharuk, a former NASL player, mocked the league at the time, saying: “NASL
doesn’t mean North American Soccer League, it means Non-American Soccer League.”285
During its early stages, MLS opted to privilege domestic talent, with one of its key founders,
Alan Rothenberg, arguing in 1995: “Why did the [NASL] fail? It sold short-term curiosity. The
novelty of seeing world-renowned imported stars soon wore off. This time around MLS will rely
on the greater pool of top home-grown talent to provide local heroes for the young kids to
support.”286 Rothenberg’s statement is debateable, given that much else—discussed previously—
led to the NASL’s demise. Moreover, after a decade, MLS loosened its roster regulations
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pertaining to foreign players to attract more international stars.287 Yet, it remains important that
teams also appeal to their local communities, in part by supporting local players.288
The Canadian Premier League (CPL) has branded itself as a league “for Canadians, by
Canadians.” This tagline is more than marketing sizzle. The CPL’s roster requirements for
Canadian players in its inaugural season were highly robust. It mandated that 50 per cent plus
one of each club’s players must be Canadian, with a limit of seven foreign nationals. Each team
also had to start at least six Canadians per game. A team could have a maximum of five foreign
players in their starting lineup. There also needed to be a minimum of three Canadians aged 21
or under in each club’s squad, and those three players were required to play a combined
minimum of 1,000 minutes per season.289 The CPL’s first commissioner, David Clanachan,
explained the importance of these restrictions: "The team owners were clear – this had to be
about developing Canadians. We put very serious handcuffs on what rosters could look like. This
is all about giving the young people a great chance, where they can see a light at the end of the
tunnel and something to aspire to."290
Supporters’ Groups
Supporters’ groups can be described as a collective of fans who organize themselves into
a defined social entity in order to cheer for their team. They promote their team in an official or
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unofficial capacity, and they exist in numerous forms.291 These groups are most common in
South American and European soccer leagues, although their influence has spread globally,
including North America. Supporters' groups are sometimes called “ultras,” a term derived from
the Latin word “ultrā" meaning “beyond,” indicating that their fanatical support is “beyond” the
norm.292 Supporters’ groups play active roles through their enthusiastic and passionate support in
large groups to visibly demonstrate their fanship and fandom. They excel at generating an
atmosphere in stadiums in order to encourage their team, while fostering a hostile environment
for their opponents. Members sing, display flags and banners in the stands during games; they
also fundraise for the team and organize pre-match events for fans.293 Though supporters’ groups
are not always directly affiliated with their teams, it is common for them to liaise with team
officials. This working relationship not only allows the team to improve its ties with its
supporters, but it benefits the organization in many other ways as well. For instance, members of
supporters’ groups can sponsor and host events, promote the team on social media, and help at
the stadium on matchdays. Supporters’ groups also attend away games, ensuring the team has
vocal backing for these games.
It is important to distinguish between the various types of supporters’ groups. These
include supporters’ groups that form: i) around a particular professional sports team (e.g., La
Doce supporters’ group for Boca Juniors [Argentinean soccer team]; ii) around a national team
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for a single sport (e.g., the Voyageurs, the supporters’ group for Canada’s national soccer teams);
or iii) around a national team across multiple sports (e.g., the Fanatics, Australian fans who
support Australian teams and athletes across several sports).294At times, however, some
supporters’ groups worldwide have been condemned for their acts of violence and hooliganism.
Franklin Foer argues that this stems from the fact soccer is still rooted in the local, with a fan’s
team identification defining who they are as a person. Foer adds:
Compare European soccer with American sporting teams. Our teams represent such broad
geographic areas, and don’t really represent anything local. What truly differentiates a
Yankees from a Mets fan? I’m not sure. But in Buenos Aires, everyone knows what separates
a Boca Juniors fan from a River Plate fan — there’s a stark difference in class. Buenos Aires
has something like eight different teams, so each team represents a distinct neighbourhood,
and when you represent something that local, you’re representing very particular identities —
class, ethnicity.295

Since the 1920s, there have been more than 300 soccer-related deaths in Argentina, with well
over a hundred of these occurring since the late 1990s.296 Consequently, in 2013, away fans were
banned in all divisions of Argentine soccer, although the rule was relaxed in 2018.297 The
Argentinian example is just one of many on a global scale. From this perspective, it is little
wonder George Orwell viewed sport as a destructive force that triggers violence, once likening it
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to “war minus the shooting.”298 Certain supporters’ groups have, at times, expressed their
belligerent behaviour through homophobic and xenophobic chanting, vile insults, and/or threats
to murder rivals. Unfortunately, soccer hooliganism oversteps the mark and takes fanaticism
much too far, as Foer notes: “Soccer has this dark side associated with its fan culture, because
the clubs represent so much more than just what city you live in.”299
On the other hand, many supporters’ groups have also played an active role in their local
communities and provided a sense of togetherness.300 For instance, supporters’ groups have
played a crucial role in the early stages of the Canadian Premier League (CPL), particularly since
most developed organically within fan communities. In fact, several supporters’ groups predated
the existence of their respective teams and the league itself. In early 2018, more than a year
before its launch, CPL officials knew about 16 different supporters’ groups across the country.
One might wonder how this is even possible. How could a supporters’ group exist before there
was even a team to support? In 2018, then-CPL President Paul Beirne, explained:
We haven't made those [supporters’ groups]. They've emerged on their own. This is exactly
the organic type of connection that people have to their club. And this is exactly why we're
very bullish about it. As an example, there's a city right next to Toronto called Mississauga.
Mississauga has a supporters’ group. We don't have an owner [there]. We don’t have a
building [stadium]. We don’t have a project there. We just have a supporters’ group. But what
they've done is stir the public's imagination, and they're doing a great job of poking local
politicians and making the creation of a public space for the purpose of playing football
[soccer] matches a priority for their local politicians. So, it's great to see, and it's great for us
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to be able to point to that as we go and try to encourage new owners to come out of the
woodwork and get involved with this [league].301

In soccer, there is a unique sense of togetherness that can organically develop when fans
unite to form a supporters’ group, especially if no team even exists at the time. It is inspiring to
witness the gradual progression of a few individuals who convene at a local bar or through social
media platforms, and later form a supporters’ group through community outreach. This natural
growth helps create an unmistakably authentic identity and culture for the group. Valour FC’s
supporters’ group is named Red River Rising, and one of its founders, Adam Johnston, recounts
how the group first formed: “I saw that supporters’ groups were forming in Halifax and
Hamilton in 2016, and I thought, ‘I wonder if there are any supporters’ groups in Winnipeg?’ I
made a Twitter account to see if there was any interest and there certainly was. We had our first
meeting in January 2017 and the rest was history.”302 Johnston was ecstatic when Winnipeg was
awarded a CPL team. Since Red River Rising’s creation, the group has met monthly at a local
pub, Garbonzo’s Pizza Pub, to converse and plan activities, rehearse chants, and design
banners.303 Red River Rising’s slogan, “Rise Together,” highlights the group’s emphasis on unity
and equality, seen with each member having a vote on such topics as songs and logos.304
Johnston also points out that the group is more than just a fan community, noting it articulates a
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larger vision for the sport in their city: “I think one of the key motivations with Red River Rising
is that we want to leave a legacy. We’re building something in Winnipeg—not only Valour FC
building pro soccer, but also with our supporters’ group. We want to build a strong legacy and
build a unique soccer culture in a city that’s often known for hockey. We believe that Winnipeg
can grow to be a true soccer culture for generations to come.”305
In Alberta, the situation was somewhat different since both Edmonton and Calgary had
soccer teams in US-based leagues before the CPL’s existence. In 2015, Calgary Foothills FC
joined the Premier Development League (PDL), a developmental US-based soccer league.306
There was plenty of enthusiasm for the new PDL team in Calgary, and this led to the creation of
the Foot Soldiers Supporters’ Group in 2014. But how did the group form? The use of social
media was once again pivotal. One of the group’s founding members, Sean Clarke, explains how
the group first came together: “I thought I’d set up a Twitter account. I went for dinner with my
wife and came back and it already had over a hundred followers and quite a bit of activity for
just being a few hours old, so I took it and ran with it.”307 Members of the Foot Soldiers
Supporters’ Group regularly convened at the Ship and Anchor, a Calgary pub, before making
their way to the stadium to watch their team play.308
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When murmurs first began about a possible CPL team in Calgary, the Foot Soldiers
Supporters’ Group faced a difficult decision, as Clarke recounts: “As the CPL chatter kind of
rose through the offseason, we talked about it and asked how we were going to move forward
with this. Do we want to support Cavalry FC, or will a new group step in? We all decided we’re
all-in on Cavalry.”309 When Cavalry FC was officially unveiled as one of the CPL’s inaugural
teams, the excitement was palpable, as the group’s members “all went to the Ship and Anchor
patio and had a few celebratory drinks.”310 Like Red River Rising, Clarke wants the sport and
Cavalry FC to become a fabric of the city’s sporting culture: “I want soccer to become the
destination for people who want to have a good time at a game, as compared to other sports in
the city where it’s a status thing. People at our stadium truly care about it … hopefully it’ll grow
year over year and with time, word of mouth gets out that this is the place to be.”311
Creating Demand
In order to create demand and attract fans, the league must have a good value proposition.
In professional sports, market research shows that new teams can make their on-field success a
secondary focus as long as they make their fans feel like they are part of the team and, by
extension, part of a social group.312 While winning remains a top marketing tool, fans also value
a strong sense of community. In other words, fans are more likely to accept a team’s
disappointing results if made to feel like an extended member of the team.313 How can this be
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achieved? Ryan Zapalac argues that a viable strategy for this is to make the team accessible. This
can include player autograph and selfie sessions, guided tours of the team’s facilities, birthday
announcements on the scoreboard, exclusive merchandise and prizes, and other interactive
activities and experiences. In the end, the goal is to increase the fans’ connection to the team.
Zapalac adds: “If you provide accessibility to the community, you make people feel as though
that player is a part of the community.”314
The fans’ matchday experience is also crucial to this. Unlike the North American Soccer
League, which saw many teams playing in venues that were simply too big to fill, most Canadian
Premier League (CPL) teams play in stadiums currently ranging between 5,000 and 10,000-seat
capacities. While this might seem small, the fans’ experience is arguably enhanced in a more
compact setting. A big venue with a sparse crowd is not conducive to an energetic atmosphere.
According to the CPL’s Director of Licensing Jim Neish, “if you don't have to play in a 30,000seat stadium, don't. Now, Forge FC and Valour FC can't do that [as they play in Canadian
Football League stadiums], but it's [about] creating those intimate experiences in Calgary,
Edmonton and Halifax that will keep people coming back week after week after week, and then
creating demand that you can build and grow off of.”315 During the CPL’s inaugural season, the
league collectively had more than 400,000 attendees, with a respectable average attendance of
4,279.316

314

Wang, “Sports Complex.”

315

Neish, interview.

316

Williams, “Canadian Premier League off to solid start.”
90

Conclusion
Sports teams are a vehicle for fans to engage with each other, as well as with the team.
They help foster a sense of togetherness—a key component of all fan communities. After Celtic
defeated Rangers 3-0 in February 2022, the Celtic manager Ange Postecoglou said: “I'm sure a
lot [of our fans] walked in with some problems in their lives and during these 95 minutes, we
made them forget that and feel good. That's something special.”317 Postecoglou’s post-game
comments illustrate the impact that a victory in a rivalry match can have for highly identified
fans. Supporting a local team provides a way for the community to unite and demonstrate
support of a common cause, boosting the spirits of local residents in the process. With soccer
continuing to be deeply entrenched in the local, teams often provide fans with a feeling of
belonging—as a resident member of a community. Some CPL teams like Cavalry FC, Forge FC
and Valour FC, have adopted esoteric team names to instill a deeper connection with local fans
by invoking the history or character of their respective cities. Another team, Pacific FC, adopted
a name linking the team to an entire region. The league has also encouraged rivalries between
teams in close geographic proximity, such as the “905 Derby” and the “Al Classico.” A strict
player quota ensures that fans can support Canadian—and sometimes local—talent on the field.
As discussed above, supporting a team entails more than focusing on winning performances.
Every team is bound to lose at some point, and there can only be one league champion at the end
of each season. It is, therefore, important for teams to identify ways to engage with their fans,
making them feel that they are part of the team. A burgeoning soccer supporter culture exists in
Canada, as demonstrated by the organic development of more than a dozen supporters’ groups

Nick McPheat, “Celtic 3-0 Rangers: Ange Postecoglou says side 'made fans forget
their problems',” BBC, February 3, 2022.
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prior to the launch of the CPL. Accordingly, the league and its teams treat these fan communities
as key stakeholders. They are crucial to the success of the league and merit a voice at the table.

92

Conclusion
Before the launch of the Canadian Premier League (CPL), Canada was the world’s
largest economy without a top-tier, national professional soccer league.318 For decades, elite teen
Canadian soccer players were stymied—with little shot at a professional career in the sport. Most
had no choice but to go overseas in order to play at the professional level. Many others simply
quit and stopped pursuing their dreams. Top-tier, professional soccer leagues involving Canadian
teams have come and gone during the past fifty years, including the North American Soccer
League, Canadian Soccer League, and Canadian Professional Soccer League. For the CPL to
achieve long-term success, it must avoid the pitfalls of its predecessors and ensure that it is
organizationally sound. This entails avoiding ownership instability, rapid overexpansion, and
run-away player salaries, factors which contributed to the demise of previous leagues. Working
in the CPL’s favour is the league’s committed cast of ownership groups and a growing appetite
for soccer in Canada, especially at youth levels.
In the past, limited television coverage has doomed many sports leagues. However, in the
modern digital age, there are ways around this issue. While traditional multichannel television
providers have long controlled the sports broadcasting industry, OTT streaming services now
pose a serious challenge to their dominance. In fact, some of the world’s best soccer leagues, like
the English Premier League, are currently only available to Canadian viewers through a
subscription to an OTT streaming service. With sports coverage rapidly pivoting towards OTT
streaming services and pay-TV customers cutting the cord at a fast clip, traditional multichannel
television providers have belatedly begun to unbundle sports packages to reduce costs for
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customers. But while they delayed and dithered, dedicated OTT sports streaming services like
DAZN have laid the groundwork for future success. It can be argued that without significant
access to traditional television markets, the CPL risks limiting its potential for growth. At the
same time, however, OneSoccer provides the CPL with a specialized platform to deliver the bulk
of its content. With the league targeting younger audiences, an OTT streaming service is
arguably the way forward.
Attracting fans is of course a major priority for the CPL. Low game attendance was a
common factor in the downfall of previous soccer leagues such as the North American Soccer
League and Canadian Soccer League. Fans are the lifeblood of any sporting organization. Highly
identified fans and members of supporters’ groups invest emotionally and economically in their
team. This (often lifelong) commitment provides them with a sense of social connectedness and
belonging derived from being a part of a fan community. While fans typically want their team to
be successful on the field, they also want to feel an attachment to the team. In order to foster this
kind of sentiment, some CPL teams have recognized the importance of locality by articulating
historic links to their city with their team naming. The league is also promoting rivalries between
teams in nearby cities. Rivalries are an important aspect of fan identity, while also having
commercial value. The CPL has positioned and marketed itself as a truly Canadian product in
hopes of resonating with fans, highlighted by a Canadian player quota. The nascent CPL has a
strong fan culture, as evidenced by the fact that many supporters’ groups formed before the start
of the league or the launch of their team. The key is to build on that backbone of support and
ensure that fans remain important stakeholders as the league continues to grow.
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The CPL’s goal is to become one of the top three leagues in CONCACAF, alongside
Major League Soccer and Mexico’s Liga MX.319 Its ultimate goal is to have 14 to 16 teams,
along with a second tier that would operate under the CPL.320 The league’s first commissioner,
David Clanachan, pointed out that by 2026, “a promotion and relegation model” could be in
place.321 That year, Canada will co-host the FIFA World Cup, alongside the US and Mexico.
With the prestige of co-hosting this high-profile event, there will be plenty of attention on
Canadian men’s soccer during the next few years. Fortunately, the national team has recently
changed course.322 A new crop of exciting young talent has emerged, spearheaded by Alphonso
Davies and Jonathan David. With qualification to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar secured,
there is a growing feeling that Canada could be on the verge of establishing itself as a true soccer
nation—something that seemed unfathomable a decade ago after that wretched 8-0 loss in
Honduras.
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for transparency,” CBC, March 8, 2021.
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Williams, “Canadian Premier League off to solid start.” In March 2021, the league
awarded the exclusive rights for an expansion team in Saskatoon to Living Sky Sports and
Entertainment Inc., a Saskatchewan-based company. However, the agreement is contingent on
the company providing a soccer-specific stadium that meets the league’s standards, with 2023
slated to be the earliest the team could join the league. In January 2022, the league announced
that its first commissioner, David Clanachan, would step down from his position after being
awarded the exclusive rights for a CPL expansion team in the Windsor/Essex County region in
Ontario. The agreement is contingent on the provision of a soccer-specific stadium and other
expansion criteria.
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FIFA declared the Canadian men’s national team as the “Most Improved Side” for
2021. In February 2022, the men’s national team reached its highest-ever position to date—No.
33—in the FIFA World Rankings.
322
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While the Canadian Premier League and the Canadian Soccer Association both harbour
long-term plans to create a top-tier, professional women’s soccer league in Canada, a suggestion
for future research is to explore the suitability and viability of such a venture. In 2018, then-CPL
President Paul Beirne said: “We’re going to hesitate to put a time against this [launching a
professional women’s league], but it’s definitely something that’s on our radar. But we have to
walk before we run, and so the first thing we need to do is get this thing [CPL] off the ground
and demonstrate that it’s going to be stable and feasible and allow that first generation of support
to really emerge and come to life.”323 This is a topic that merits further exploration and analysis.

323

Beirne, “A new leaf.”
96

Bibliography
Interviews
Amoyal, David (soccer podcaster). By Farzan Mirzazadeh. Via Western University Zoom. January 2,
2021
Bontis, Nick (president of CSA). By Farzan Mirzazadeh. Via WhatsApp. June 2, 2021.
Laramee, Kevin (soccer reporter). By Farzan Mirzazadeh. Via Western University Zoom. January 5,
2021.
Nasrallah, Roy (vice-president of marketing at CPL). By Farzan Mirzazadeh. Via Western University
Zoom. February 11, 2021.
Neish, Jim (director of licensing at CPL). By Farzan Mirzazadeh. Via Western University Zoom.
December 10, 2020.

Other Primary Sources
Ault, Bill. “National Dream: The OSA’s Hopes for the CPSL Are National.” Ontario Soccer
Association, August 25, 1997.
Austin, Daniel. ‘“Cavalry FC’ the Canadian Premier League Team in Calgary.” Calgary Sun, May 17,
2018.
Baker, Chris. “Soccer: Is It Still the Sport of the 80s?” Los Angeles Times, November 12, 1981.
Bedakian, Armen. ‘“Rise Together’: Winnipeg’s Red River Rising Establishing Traditions Ahead of
CPL Launch.” Canadian Premier League, August 3, 2018.
Beirne, Paul. “A new leaf for Canadian Soccer.” In Sport: Digital and Social, hosted by Richard
Clarke. Podcast audio. May 5, 2018.
Boorstin, Julia. “Streaming Sports Service DAZN Chasing NFL Sunday Ticket Rights.” CNBC,
March 2, 2020.
Brunt, Stephen. “Hockey And Our National Heartbeat.” Sportsnet, 2017.
Bures, Frank. “Soccerworld.” Atlantic, July 2004.
Campbell, Colin. “Why We Don’t Watch Soccer.” Maclean’s, July 22, 2010.
Canadian Premier League. “Foot Soldiers SG Hoping to Make CPL Matches a ‘Destination’ in
Calgary.” August 3, 2018.
97

Canadian Press. “Mexico Dominates Canada 3-0 in World Cup Soccer Qualifying.” March 25, 2016.
Canadian Soccer Association. “Canada Soccer Releases Report On Division II Soccer Viability in
Canada.” February 4, 2013.
Canadian Soccer League. “A Much Needed Stronger Professional Soccer Structure Not On The
Horizon.” July 4, 2014.
Canadian Soccer League v. Canadian Soccer Association - Clarification of Award, No. 13-0194,
April 26, 2013, (Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada).
Carp, Sam. “Digital Sports Media Company Saw Turnover Reach US$878m for Year Prior to Covid19.” SportsPro, January 4, 2021.
CBC. “Major League Soccer on Its Way to Toronto.” October 28, 2005.
CBC. “That One Time Canada Made It to the World Cup.” July 6, 2018.
Charlebois, Sylvain. “Eliminating the Rural-Urban Divide, One Internet Connection at a Time.”
Hamilton Spectator, November 30, 2020.
Conger, Kate and Erin Griffith. “As Life Moves Online, an Older Generation Faces a Digital Divide.”
New York Times, March 27, 2020.
Convergence Research Group. The Battle for the Canadian Couch Potato: OTT and TV, April 2019.
April 2019.
Cyphers, Luke. “Facebook Declines to Renew UEFA, La Liga Broadcasts in Latin America and
India.” Yahoo Sports, March 3, 2021.
Davidson, Neil. “Toronto FC Success Drives up Ratings While Struggling Jays’ Numbers Drop.”
Canadian Press, August 8, 2017.
Davidson, Neil. “Canadian Premier League Opens up about Finances, Saying It’s Time for
Transparency.” Canadian Press, March 8, 2021.
Davis, Matt. “Canadian Premier League: How Do You Start a Brand New Professional League?”
BBC, February 1, 2019.
Deloitte. Smart Everything, Everywhere: Mobile Consumer Survey 2017 - The Australian Cut, by
Drumm, Jeremy, Nicholas White, Morne Swiegers, and Maggie Davey. 2017.
Deloitte. The Future of Sports Broadcasting: Enhancing Digital Fan Engagement, by Deutsch, Adam,
Kat Harwood, Lee Teller, and Chad Deweese. 2018.

98

Deloitte. Digital Media Trends Survey 13th Edition: Piecing It Together, by Westcott, Kevin, Jeff
Loucks, Kevin Downs, and Jeanette Watson. 2019.
deVos, Jason. “Apathy toward Canadian soccer is why nothing is going to change.” TSN, January 22,
2015.
Dheensaw, Cleve. “Coach: More pro Franchises the Best Way to Ensure Soccer Success.” Times
Colonist, June 28, 2014.
Dobby, Christine. “Everything You Need to Know about IPTV.” Globe and Mail, January 17, 2017.
Dobby, Christine. “Rogers Launches Long-Delayed Internet-TV Service, Ignite TV, as Telecom
Battle Heats Up.” Globe and Mail, August 19, 2018.
English Football League. 2019 Supporters Survey. 2019.
Epstein, Adam. “Sports Fans, Accept Your Streaming Future.” Quartz, January 25, 2021.
Fehr, Israel. “Soccer Ranks as Most Popular Team Sport among Canadian Youth According to
Study.” Yahoo Sports, June 11, 2014.
FIFA. 2018 FIFA World Cup: Global Broadcast and Audience Summary. 2018.
FIFA. Professional Football Report 2019. 2019.
Figueiredo, Bernardo and Torgeir Aleti. “Seniors Struggle with Technology, and Often Their Kids
Won’t Help.” Conversation, January 28, 2020.
Futterman, Matthew. “After the Grand Slams, Tennis Plots Its Growth Plan.” New York Times,
October 13, 2020.
Gaines, Cork, and Mike Nudelman. “The NHL Is on Pace to Have More American Players than
Canadian Players in 11 Years.” Business Insider, November 18, 2017.
Glover, Robin. “Nuke Soccer: The Vince Ursini Interview.” Rocket Robin’s Soccer in Toronto,
August 23, 2004.
Glover, Robin. “CSL Granted Full National Membership, Will Become a More Significant Part of
Canada’s pro Soccer.” Rocket Robin’s Soccer in Toronto, February 13, 2010.
Government of Canada. Federal Policy for hosting international sport events. 2021.
Hall, Matthew. ‘“We’re Second-Class Citizens’: Why MLS in Canada Benefits Everyone except
Canada.” Guardian, September 13, 2016.

99

Hill, Declan. “Semi-pro Canadian Soccer League a Hotspot of Match-Fixing.” Toronto Star,
December 12, 2016.
Houpt, Simon. “We like to Watch Sports. So Why Is It so Difficult?’ Globe and Mail, December 13,
2019.
Houpt, Simon. “Sports Broadcasters Have a Dirty Little Secret about Airing Live Games.” Globe and
Mail, April 19, 2020.
Houpt, Simon. “Canada’s Men’s Soccer Went from Couldn’t-Give-It-Away to Show-Me-theMoney.” Globe and Mail, November 12, 2021.
Houpt, Simon. “fuboTV buys Canadian rights to English Premier League.” Globe and Mail, January
13, 2022.
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. High-Speed Access for All: Canada’s
Connectivity Strategy. 2019.
Insider Intelligence. Sports OTT Landscape in Canada: How Digital and Mobile Streaming Is
Disrupting TV in 2019, by Briggs, Paul and Paul Verna. January 24, 2019.
Insider Intelligence. Canada Digital Video 2020: Viewership Reaches New Heights This Year, by
Briggs, Paul. October 6, 2020.
Institute for Canadian Citizenship. Playing Together: New Citizens, Sports & Belonging. 2016.
James, Paul. “Canada Needs a Soccer Identity.” Globe and Mail, July 12, 2010.
Katz, Brandon. “The Death of Pay TV Is Coming Sooner Than You Think.” Observer, February 25,
2020.
Keating, Steve. “Hockey Is More than a Game to Canadians.” Reuters, January 28, 2010.
Keating, Steve. “Soccer: Canada Gets a League of Its Own with CPL Launch.” Reuters, April 26,
2019.
Kennedy, Peter. “Canadian Rejection Spurred Player to Top.” Globe and Mail, May 30, 2002.
Kenney, Trevor. “Economic Health of New Canadian Premier League Based on Groundwork from U
of L’s Dr. Duane Rockerbie.” University of Lethbridge, June 14, 2019.
Kidwell, Joe. “226 Countries Can’t Be Wrong.” Bleacher Report, November 14, 2008.
Klein, Jeff Z. “The Good Friday Brawl.” New York Times, March 20, 2008.

100

Kloke, Joshua. “Will the Canadian Premier League Turn the Country into a Football Power?”
Guardian, April 30, 2019.
Leach, Michael. “Canadian Premier League Takes Formative Steps with Open Tryouts.” Sportsnet,
October 10, 2018.
Leichtman Research Group. “Pay-TV in the U.S. 2019.” November 5, 2019.
Lewis, Michael. “How the Birth and Death of the NASL Changed Soccer in America Forever.”
Guardian, October 20, 2018.
Littleton, Cynthia. “AT&T Chief: HBO Max Will ‘Ultimately’ Offer Live News, Sports.” Variety,
July 24, 2019.
Littleton, Cynthia and Janko Roettgers. “Ted Sarandos on How Netflix Predicted the Future of TV.”
Variety, August 21, 2018.
MacDonald, Barry. “Canadian pro Soccer in Jeopardy.” CBC, June 8, 1992.
McDonald, Archie. “Soccer Rebirth.” Vancouver Sun, February 26, 1987.
McPheat, Nick. “Celtic 3-0 Rangers: Ange Postecoglou Says Side ‘Made Fans Forget Their
Problems.”’ BBC, February 3, 2022.
Meehall Wood, Mike. “Why The Copa Libertadores Riot Goes Much Further Than Just River And
Boca.” Forbes, November 27, 2018.
Milton, Steve. “Ticats Involved in Early Days of New Vision for Canadian Soccer.” Hamilton
Spectator, June 7, 2013.
Milton, Steve. “New Canadian pro Soccer League Makes Major Hire.” Hamilton Spectator,
November 15, 2016.
Milton, Steve. “A ‘New’ Canadian Nationalism through Sport.” Hamilton Spectator, June 23, 2017.
Molinaro, John. “Canadian Premier League FAQ: What You Need to Know.” Sportsnet, April 24,
2019.
Nachman, Gideon. “Is It Possible to Manufacture a Football Rivalry? MLS Has Tried ...” Guardian,
May 29, 2017.
New York Times. “Some Failures Of the N.A.S.L.” November 27, 1983.
Noronha, Charmaine. “O-Le Canada! Hockey Homeland Is Mad for World Cup.” Associated Press,
July 11, 2014.

101

O’Callaghan, Eoin. “Upheaval Motivated Asmir Begovic’s World Cup Journey from Bosnia to
Brazil, via Canada.” Yahoo Sports, June 9, 2014.
Ontario Soccer Association. “OSA To Pilot Semi-Pro League1 Ontario In 2014-2015.” November 15,
2013.
Paikin, Steve. ‘“More to It than Just Hockey’: Revisiting the Summit Series, 48 Years Later.” TVO,
January 13, 2021.
Palmer, Brian. “How Much Is a Sports Rivalry Worth?” Slate, August 2, 2013.
Peterson, Tim. “How Niche Streaming Services Thrive in the Land of Giants.” Digiday, October 24,
2019.
Pew Research Center. Digital Readiness Gaps, by Horrigan, John B. September 20, 2016.
Pew Research Center. Tech Adoption Climbs Among Older Adults, by Anderson, Monica and Andrew
Perrin. May 17, 2017.
Phaneuf, Alicia. “Most US Households Won’t Have a Pay TV Subscription by 2024.” Insider
Intelligence. October 8, 2020.
Plumer, Bradford. “How Soccer Explains the World.” Mother Jones, August 4, 2004.
Popper, Ben. “The Great Unbundling: Cable TV as We Know It Is Dying.” Verge, April 22, 2015.
PwC. Consumer Intelligence Series: I Stream, You Stream - Winning in a Video World by McCafrey,
Mark, Paige Hayes, and Jason Wagner. 2017.
Radio-Canada. “Retour d’une Ligue Semi-Pro.” August 30, 2011.
Rethink Management Group. In A League Of Our Own, by Easton, James, Duane Rockerbie, and
Richard Whittall. July 2012.
Rogers. “Discontinuation of Our Digital TV Packages: FAQs.” October 28, 2019.
Roku. Cord Cutting in Uncertain Times. 2020.
Rowaan, Dave. “Canadian Soccer League De-Sanctioned, Will Play in 2013.” SB Nation: Waking the
Red, March 5, 2013.
Rumleski, Kathy. “Players, Teams Clamouring to Be Part of Soccer League.” London Free Press,
November 8, 2000.
Ruthven, Graham. “MLS Ultras: Plastic Wannabes or Sign of a Thriving League?” Guardian,
September 25, 2018.
102

Rycroft, Ben, Alex Shprintsen, and Joseph Loiero. “Exclusive: Canadian Soccer an Easy Target for
Match-Fixing.” CBC, September 12, 2012.
Rycroft, Ben. “CSA Cuts Ties with Canadian Soccer League.” CBC, January 31, 2013.
Satell, Greg. “A Look Back At Why Blockbuster Really Failed And Why It Didn’t Have To.” Forbes,
September 5, 2014.
Schneider, Michael and Kate Aurthur. “R.I.P. Cable TV: Why Hollywood Is Slowly Killing Its
Biggest Moneymaker.” Variety, July 21, 2020.
Sherman, Alex. “Media Executives Are Finally Accepting the Decline of Cable TV as They Plot a
New Path Forward.” CNBC, October 24, 2020.
Sherman, Alex. “Amazon’s Exclusive ‘Thursday Night Football’ Package Will Begin in 2022 Instead
of 2023.” CNBC, May 3, 2021.
Smith, Rory. “At Global Clubs, Local Players Serve as Connective Tissue.” New York Times,
February 6, 2018.
Smith, Rory. “Being More Like Athletic Bilbao.” New York Times, May 22, 2020.
Solutions Research Group Consultants. Canadian Youth Sports Report. June 10, 2014.
Soper, Spencer, Scott Soshnick, and Sarah Frier. “Amazon to Pay $50 Million to Stream NFL
Thursday Games: Source.” Bloomberg, April 5, 2017.
Soshnick, Scott, Sarah Frier, and Scott Moritz. “Twitter Gets NFL Thursday Night Games for a
Bargain Price.” Bloomberg, April 5, 2016.
Spangler, Todd. “Facebook Nabs MLB Exclusive Global Rights to 25 Games.” Variety, March 9,
2018.
SportBusiness. “Mediapro Suffered €702m Revenue Hit in 2020.” April 20, 2021.
Sporting News. “Why Is Arsenal’s Nickname “The Gunners”? Club Term & Badge Explained,”
March 4, 2020.
Statista. Pay TV operating revenue in Canada from 2009 to 2019. December 8, 2020.
Statista. Number of Subscription Over-the-Top (OTT) Video Viewers in Canada from 2019 to 2025,
by Stoll, Julia. October 7, 2021.
Statistics Canada. Immigration and Diversity: Population Projections for Canada and Its Regions,
2011 to 2036, by Morency, Jean-Dominique, Éric Caron Malenfant, and Samuel MacIsaac.
January 25, 2017.
103

Stieg, Cory. “Sports Fans Have Higher Self-Esteem and Are More Satisfied with Their Lives
(Whether Their Teams Win or Lose).” CNBC, July 23, 2020.
Tabish, Josh. “New Internet Performance Data Shows the Staggering Scale of Canada’s Urban-Rural
Digital Divide.” Canadian Internet Registration Authority, May 8, 2020.
United Soccer League. “USL Unveils New Structure: One Central Brand, Three Leagues, Evolving
for the Future,” September 25, 2018.
Unwin, Will. “First Canada Beat the US. Now Focus Turns to the CPL Final as Soccer Expands.”
Guardian, October 25, 2019.
Weber, Marc. “Some Canadian Players Granted Domestic Status in MLS; Generation Adidas Canada
Created.” The Province, November 30, 2016.
Westervelt, Ted. “Banging Your Head Against The Wall For 115 Years Hurts.” Bleacher Report, July
28, 2009.
Whip Media Group Company. Beyond The Big Three: The Streaming Wars Are Upon Us, by von
Krogh, Alex and David Herrin. October 2019.
Williams, Bob. “Canadian Premier League off to Solid Start after Filling Void for Players and Fans.”
SportBusiness, November 6, 2019.
Wilson, Jonathan. “How Argentinian Football Had the Chance to Prove It Had Changed – and Blew
It.” Guardian, November 26, 2018.
Wong, Edward Hon-Sing. “Levelling the Playing Field.” Briarpatch, February 23, 2021.
Yannis, Alex. “Soccer; They’re Showing Up.” New York Times, June 30, 1996.

Secondary Sources
Alexander, Donald L., and William Kern. “The Economic Determinants of Professional Sports
Franchise Values.” Journal of Sports Economics 5, no. 1 (February 2004): 51–66.
Bairner, Alan. Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Bairner, Alan. “Sport, Nationalism and Globalization: Relevance, Impact, Consequences.”
Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences, no. 49 (2008): 43–53.
Beck, Peter J. ‘“War Minus the Shooting”: George Orwell on International Sport and the Olympics.”
Sport in History 33, no. 1 (January 30, 2013).

104

Belshaw, John Douglas. Canadian History: Post-Confederation. 2nd ed. BCcampus, 2020.
Brown, Adam, Tim Crabbe, and Gavin Mellor. “English Professional Football and Its Communities.”
International Review of Modern Sociology 32, no. 2 (2006).
Clapson, Mark. The Routledge Companion to Britain in the Twentieth Century. 1st ed. New York:
Routledge, 2009.
Crawford, Garry. Consuming Sport: Fans, Sport and Culture. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2004.
Creswell, John W. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 4th
ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014.
Davis, Todd and John Higgins. “A Blockbuster Failure: How an Outdated Business Model Destroyed
a Giant.” Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case Studies, 2013, 3–4.
Duerr, Glen M.E. “Playing for the ‘Bleu et Blanc’ or for the Habs: Ice Hockey and Quebecois
Nationalism.” Central European Journal of Canadian Studies 10, no. 11 (2016): 11–29.
Francis, John D., and Congcong Zheng. “Learning Vicariously From Failure: The Case of Major
League Soccer and the Collapse of the North American Soccer League.” Group and
Organization Management 35, no. 5 (October 2010): 542–71.
Gaylord Jr., Jack O., and David L. Groves. “Factors in the Formation and Development of
Professional Sports Leagues.” International Review of Modern Sociology 23, no. 1 (Spring
1993).
Hills, Matthew. Fan Cultures. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2002.
Holt, Richard. “Living in the City: Working-class Communities.” In Sport and the British: A Modern
History, 172. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Hutchins, Brett, Bo Li, and David Rowe. “Over-the-Top Sport: Live Streaming Services, Changing
Coverage Rights Markets and the Growth of Media Sport Portals.” Media, Culture and Society
41, no. 7 (2019): 975–94.
Jose, Colin. Canadian Encyclopedia of Soccer: Keeping Score. 1st ed. Vaughan: Soccer Hall of Fame
and Museum, 1998.
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Mastromartino, Brandon, and James J. Zhang. “Affective Outcomes of Membership in a Sport Fan
Community.” Movement Science and Sport Psychology, May 8, 2020.

105

Mastromartino, Brandon, James J. Zhang, Candice Hollenbeck, Welch Suggs, and Daniel P.
Connaughton. “Conceptualizing Sense of Membership in a Sport Fan Community.” Journal of
Sport Behaviour 402, no. 3 (September 2019): 332–64.
Mastromartino, Brandon, Wen-hao Winston Chou, and James J. Zhang. “The Passion That Unites Us
All: The Culture and Consumption of Sports Fans.” In Exploring the Rise of Fandom in
Contemporary Consumer Culture, edited by Cheng Lu Wang. Hershey: IGI Global, 2017.
Milasincic, Andreja. “Winter Sport Nationalism: The Canadian Olympic Press from Calgary 1988 to
Vancouver 2010.” PhD diss., Western University, 2017.
Nathan, Daniel A., ed. Rooting for the Home Team: Sport, Community, and Identity. 1st ed.
Champaign: University of Illnois Press, 2013.
Peitz, Martin, and Tommaso M. Valletti. “Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay-Tv versus Freeto-Air.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, no. 4 (July 2008): 949–65.
Reysen, Stephen, and Nyla R. Branscombe. “Fanship and Fandom: Comparisons Between Sport and
Non-Sport Fans.” Journal of Sport Behaviour 33, no. 2 (June 2010): 176–93.
Ridder, Hans-Gerd. “The Theory Contribution of Case Study Research Designs.” Business Research
10 (February 16, 2017).
Russell, Dave. “The Historical Significance of Locality and Regional Identity to Football.” In
Routledge Handbook of Football Studies, edited by John Hughson, Ramon Spaaij, Joseph
Maguire, and Kevin Moore, 18–29. Milton Park: Taylor and Francis, 2016.
Soares, John. “Cold War, Hot Ice: International Ice Hockey, 1947-1980.” Journal of Sport History 34,
no. 2 (Summer 2007): 207–30.
Strangelove, Michael. Post-TV: Piracy, Cord-Cutting, and the Future of Television. Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press, 2015.
Tyler, B. David, and Joe B. Cobbs. “Rival Conceptions of Rivalry: Why Some Competitions Mean
More than Others.” European Sport Management Quarterly 15, no. 2 (February 23, 2015): 227–
48.
Tyler, Bruce David. “Fan Communities and Subgroups: Exploring Individuals’ Supporter Group
Experiences.” PhD diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2013.
Wakefield, Kirk L. Team Sports Marketing. 1st ed., 2007.
Wang, Shirley. “Sports Complex: The Science Behind Fanatic Behavior.” Association for
Psychological Science, May 1, 2006.

106

Wann, Daniel L. “Examining the Potential Causal Relationship Between Sport Team Identification
and Psychological Well-Being.” Journal of Sport Behaviour 29, no. 1 (March 2006): 79–95.
Wann, Daniel L. “The Causes and Consequences of Sport Team Identification.” In Handbook of
Sports and Media, edited by Arthur A. Raney and Bryant Jennings. Routledge, 2006.
Zagnoli, Patrizia, and Elena Radicchi. “The Football-Fan Community as a Determinant Stakeholder in
Value Co-Creation.” Sport in Society, November 29, 2010, 1532–51.
Zemsky, Robert, Gregory R Wegner, and William F. Massy. ‘To Publish and Perish’. In Remaking
the American University: Market-Smart and Mission-Centered. New Brunswick, New Jersey;
London: Rutgers University Press, 2005.
Zhang, James J. and Brenda G. Pitts. The Global Football Industry: Marketing Perspectives. New
York, NY: Routledge, 2018.

107

